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ABSTRACT
The primary goal of power system operators is to effectively and econom-
ically maintain operational reliability—a power system is said to be in an
operationally reliable state if the supply-demand balance is met, and the
system can tolerate the failure of a small number of components without
jeopardizing continued operation. In pursuit of this goal, operators rely on
so-called operational reliability tools to schedule resources and manage uncer-
tainty. Conventional operational reliability tools include market-scheduling
tools, e.g., the real-time security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED), and
system-monitoring tools, e.g., real-time contingency analysis (RTCA).
Due to the stringent computational speed requirements of real-time oper-
ations, conventional operational reliability tools make extensive use of power
flow sensitivities to simplify the mathematical representation of the physical
electricity system. Moreover, the computation of such sensitivities requires
a model of the system, which is typically obtained oﬄine. As such, the ef-
fectiveness of these tools is highly dependent on the accuracy of the model
from which such sensitivities are computed, which may be compromised due
to erroneous input parameters, undetected topology changes, and changes in
ambient conditions. Inaccurate sensitivities are an impediment to effective
electricity market operation and price formation, as well as compromising
system operational reliability.
The 2011 San Diego blackout brought to light an additional shortcoming
of conventional operational reliability tools: they do not provide system op-
erators the ability to predict the angle of the voltage across the breaker of
a transmission line that will arise in the event of the line’s outage—which
we refer to as the outage angle—or means by which to mitigate such angles.
Indeed, the conventional SCED process does not include any means by which
to bring outage angle considerations to bare on the generator dispatch, which
determines if the system will be in an operationally reliable state.
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In this thesis, we address the aforementioned shortcomings of conventional
operational reliability tools by formulating a set of measurement-based op-
erational reliability tools and deriving a sensitivity-based approach to mon-
itoring and mitigating line outage angles. To this end, we provide: (i) a
measurement-based approach to marginal loss factor (LF) estimation, which
harnesses phasor measurement unit (PMU) measurements to estimate the
LFs online rather than computing them from a power flow model; (ii) a for-
mulation of the line outage angle factor (LOAF), the computation of which
requires only existing sensitivities, the angle factors (AFs) and injection shift
factors (ISFs), and which can be deployed to formulate a tool for outage angle
monitoring and an angle-constrained SCED; and (iii) a measurement-based
formulation of the SCED, which utilizes the measurement-based LFs along
with measurement-based ISFs to decouple the SCED process and underlying
RTCA from the vulnerabilities associated with a system model. Our hope is
that the proposed tools will enhance the real-time operational reliability pro-
cess and contribute to more effective and efficient power system operations.
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To the universe, in homage to the endless stream of confounding and
inspiring questions that spring forth from its infinite depths.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, we set the stage for the thesis. To begin, we describe the role
of operational reliability tools in the power systems operational context and
motivate the need for new operational reliability tools. Next, we describe
existing work related to the operational reliability tools we propose and the
shortcomings of existing approaches. Then, we describe our contributions
and the manner in which they address the identified shortcomings. We close
the chapter with a brief outline of the thesis.
1.1 Motivation
Reliable access to electricity is fundamentally important to a functioning
modern society and economy. This fact is derived from electricity’s status
as a key input to numerous processes relied on by its consumers on a day-
to-day basis so as to maintain their standard of living and create economic
opportunities. As such, consumers require electricity system operators to en-
sure access to electricity is maintained except under extreme circumstances,
which is reflected in power system reliability standards [1]. On the other
hand, there are limits to how much consumers can, or are willing to, pay for
electricity access. Thus, they further require that system operators supply
electricity in the most economic manner possible.
Meeting such requirements is a challenging task for system operators; the
electricity system is a complex network composed of tens of thousands of
thermal, hydro, and renewable generation resources, loads, and transmis-
sion elements, and operating the system is subject to numerous sources of
uncertainty, e.g., load uncertainty, equipment outage uncertainty, and the
uncertainty associated with renewable generator outputs, such as wind and
solar photovoltaic generators. As an additional layer of complexity, system
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operators must also schedule resources to meet the supply-demand balance
considering multiple decision-making time horizons, from day-ahead (DA)
scheduling, with horizons of days to weeks, and based on forecast system
conditions; to real-time (RT) scheduling, with horizons of minutes to hours,
and based on a combination of measured or estimated system conditions and
forecast system conditions. To manage such uncertainty and economically
and reliably deliver on-demand access to electricity, system operators rely
on operational reliability tools. These tools enable them to strike a balance
between consumers’ competing requirements of high reliability and economic
electricity access. The work presented in this thesis provides an enhanced set
of operational reliability tools aimed at assisting system operators in more
effectively meeting these requirements.
The majority of the uncertainty faced by system operators comes to bear
on real-time scheduling processes, during which the actual operation of the
system takes place. Thus, real-time operational reliability tools play the
largest role in maintaining operational reliability. Conventional real-time
operational reliability tools include market-scheduling tools, e.g., the real-
time security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED), and system-monitoring
tools, e.g., real-time contingency analysis (RTCA). Furthermore, due to the
short time horizons in the real-time operational context, which translate into
strict computational requirements, such tools have typically been based on
sensitivities derived from a linearized representation of the power system, e.g.,
marginal loss factors (LFs) and injection shift factors (ISFs), which we will
introduce in Section 1.2 and discuss in detail in Chapters 3 and 5, respectively.
These tools enable system operators to simultaneously optimize the dispatch
of system resources to meet the load and requirements of reliability standards
while taking into due consideration the costs of doing so.
System operators, guided by existing real-time operational reliability tools,
generally have a long track record of success in maintaining reliable and eco-
nomic access to electricity. However, a number of high-impact events, e.g.,
the 2003 Northeast Blackout [2] and the 2011 San Diego Blackout [3], have
exposed weaknesses in operational reliability processes that stem primar-
ily from: (i) a lack of adequate tools for monitoring and controlling pre-
and post-outage voltage angles at the terminal buses of outaged transmis-
sion lines; and (ii) the widespread dependance of conventional tools on a
model of the internal system and that of neighboring systems, which may
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be out of date or contain erroneous data. Furthermore, real-time opera-
tional processes, such as state estimation,1 the results of which are required
to perform conventional RTCA and formulate the SCED, are built around
measurements obtained from the telemetry system, primarily the supervisory
control and data acquisition system (SCADA). However, SCADA provides
non-time-synchronized measurements every two to four seconds [4], which
limits its usefulness in the development of next-generation operational tools.
Until recently, there were no readily available means of addressing these
weaknesses. However, the rapidly expanding deployment of phasor measure-
ment units (PMUs), which provide time-synchronized measurements at a rate
of 30-120 measurements per second [5], is facilitating the proliferation of a
new generation of operational tools that harness the very high frequency and
time synchronicity of their measurements (see, e.g., [6], [7]). Indeed, thou-
sands of PMUs have been installed in North America over the past decade
and many relays come equipped with PMU functionality (see, e.g., [8]). The
use of PMU data in real-time operations has been promoted as a means
by which to circumvent the shortcomings of the existing telemetry system,
and reduce the frequency of occurrence and the magnitude of the impact
of preventable outages. In the context of the work we present in this thesis,
PMUs enable the estimation of power system sensitivities from measurements
collected throughout the system rather than the computation of those sensi-
tivities from a model of the system obtained oﬄine. Such sensitivities play
a key role in the development of operational reliability tools.
In this thesis, we address the shortcomings of conventional operational
reliability tools and propose a set of enhanced ones, which harness power
system sensitivities, both (i) those estimated from PMU measurements, as
well as (ii) those derived from a power flow model. To this end, we propose:
(i) a measurement-based approach to the estimation of marginal loss factors
(LFs), which are a key input for electricity market scheduling processes, e.g.,
SCED; (ii) a set of line angle monitoring tools based on a proposed general-
ized approach to the computation of line outage angle factors (LOAFs), which
provide system operators a pre-outage mean to manage the post-outage angle
1State estimation is a process which utilizes measurements, e.g., voltage, active power
flow, from throughout the system and an assumed model of the system to estimate the
system state. The system state typically consists of the voltages and voltage angles at
each bus, however, it may also include active and reactive power flow and power injection
measurements as well as transformer tap positions and switch and breaker statuses [4].
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that will arises between the terminal buses of a transmission line if its out-
age occurs; and (iii) a measurement-based approach to the real-time SCED,
which requires sensitivity-based flow constraints and reliability constraints
identified using RTCA.
1.2 Background and Related Work
In this section, we provide context for the topics discussed in the thesis and
describe the existing work on operational reliability tools while pointing out
the shortcomings of such tools. We begin by providing some the background
on LFs and LOAFs. Then, we give an overview of the SCED.
1.2.1 Marginal Loss Factors
Transmission losses are an unavoidable result of the physics that governs
power transfer over an electric power system. Effectively modeling losses so
as to capture their economic and physical impacts has been a goal of power
engineers since the emergence of electricity scheduling algorithms [9]. Over
the subsequent half century, numerous methods, e.g., penalty factors and the
B-coefficients method, have been proposed to represent total and marginal
transmission losses—the incremental losses resulting from an incremental
increase in the load—in the electricity scheduling problem (see, e.g., [10, 11,
12, 13]).
The emergence of competitive electricity markets based on marginal pric-
ing principles over the past two decades has driven the need to associate a
location-specific price with losses. To meet this need, the so-called marginal
loss factors (LFs) emerged as a mean by which to capture the dependence of
system-wide losses on the location of active power injections [13, 14]. Loss
factors are linear sensitivities of the system-wide losses with respect to power
injections, assuming the change in injection is balanced by a single slack bus
or set of slack buses. Conventionally, model-based LFs are derived from the
power flow Jacobian [13]; furthermore, the LF computation requires the a
priori specification of distributed slack weights, which define the distribution
of the active power mismatch and losses among the buses in the system nec-
essary to maintain the system-wide power balance. Such distributed slack
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weights are typically selected based on the bus load distribution or generator
output distribution (see, e.g., [15, 16]).
Loss factors are principally used in: (i) market scheduling procedures for
setting generator dispatch targets, e.g. SCED, and (ii) the computation of
locational marginal prices (LMPs) (see, e.g., [15, 16]). The LFs, through the
dispatch targets and LMPs, also impact the distribution of payments among
market participants. The losses for large interconnected power systems are
substantial and the associated costs are non-trivial. Indeed, the total losses
in the PJM Interconnection2 for 2014 were 17,150 GWh, and the cost of those
losses was in excess of $1.4 billion [17]. The economic impacts of inaccuracy
in the LFs may likewise be substantial and, as such, accurate LFs are a
critical component of efficient and effective electricity market operation.
Existing Approaches and Shortcomings. As stated above, LFs are a
necessary component of the real-time market scheduling procedure, and play
a key role in the assignment of a location-specific price to losses. The conven-
tional approach to computing LFs relies on the power flow Jacobian, which
in turn relies on the availability of an accurate model of the system (see, e.g.,
[14]). As such, the conventional LFs are vulnerable to undetected changes
in the model topology and erroneous model data. Measurement-based ap-
proaches to sensitivity estimation that overcome the challenges associated
with computing sensitivities from a model have been proposed in [18] and
[19]. However, this previous work has not addressed the use of PMU mea-
surements for the estimation of LFs.
1.2.2 Line Outage Angle Factors
It has long been known that a transmission line breaker that has tripped
open can be safely reclosed only if the outage angle—the voltage angle differ-
ence between the terminal buses of a transmission line after it is outaged—is
sufficiently small (see, e.g., [20]). In fact, the failure to reclose a breaker
due to a large line outage angle was a contributing factor in the chain of
events that ultimately resulted in the 2011 San Diego blackout [3]. More-
2The PJM Interconnection is a U.S.-based regional transmission organization which
oversees market scheduling processes to serve some 60 million customers and schedules
167 GW of generating capacity.
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over, in the case of the San Diego blackout, the system operator did not
have in place a systematic mean by which to determine the appropriate ac-
tions, e.g., generation redispatch, so as to bring the outage angle within a
range that permitted the line breakers to be successfully reclosed. Indeed,
the after-the-fact assessment of the blackout event concluded that “underly-
ing factors that contributed to the event... [included] not providing effective
tools and operating instructions for use when reclosing lines with large phase
angle differences across the reclosing breakers [3].” Furthermore, the report
recommended that “transmission operators should have: (1) the tools nec-
essary to determine phase angle differences following the loss of lines; and
(2) mitigation and operating plans for reclosing lines with large phase angle
differences [3].” The line outage angle factors (LOAFs) are one potential
mean of addressing these identified needs.
A LOAF provides the ratio of the difference between the line angle and
outage angle, and the flow through the line before the outage occurs. The
LOAFs can be used to formulate accurate and computationally efficient tools
for assessing the impacts of line outages on voltage angles and appropriate
responses by system operators to mitigating reliability issues arising from
large line outage angles. However, LOAFs have received scant attention in
the academic literature and system operators have yet to recognize their
utility and embrace LOAF-based tools.
Existing Approaches and Shortcomings. Formulations of angle-based
dispatch tools go back to the 1980s (see, e.g., [21]); the LOAFs were first pro-
posed in [22]. However, such tools focused on the control of phase-shifting
transformers and did not address the issue of large line outage angles. Ad-
ditionally, the derivation of the LOAFs in [22] utilizes the dc assumptions3
and, as such, the LOAFs remain fixed for all operating points under a specific
topology; the derivation also requires the computation of the bus impedance
matrix for each outage topology—a computationally burdensome require-
ment for online applications. Finally, the integration of LOAFs into the
SCED and other operational reliability processes and the impact of angle
constraints on LMPs remains an unexplored area of research.
3The dc assumptions can be stated as follows: (i) the system is lossless, (ii) the voltage
at each bus is approximately equal to one p.u., (iii) the difference in the voltage angles
between each pair of connected buses is small [13].
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1.2.3 The Security-Constrained Economic Dispatch
The majority of electricity consumers in the United States are served by
entities that procure energy in Independent System Operator (ISO)- or Re-
gional Transmission Organization (RTO)-run markets [23]. ISO/RTOs over-
see reliability-focused scheduling procedures consisting of a sequence of for-
ward markets based on security-constrained unit commitment- and economic
dispatch-based algorithms (see, e.g., [24], [25]). The goal of these processes
is to schedule resources on various time-scales such that the system opera-
tor can maintain the supply-demand balance around the clock, including the
impacts of losses, and satisfy operational and physical constraints imposed
by the electricity network and reliability standards. Moreover, the market
outcomes include resource dispatch targets and the prices for energy, the
locational marginal prices (LMPs), and ancillary services [26].4
The so-called real-time markets are the final stage in the market scheduling
process, and real-time SCED and the underlying RTCA are key components
of that stage and key operational reliability tools. Typically, the real-time
SCED is formulated using model-based LFs to capture system losses and
model-based ISFs to represent network flows [13].
In the power system real-time operational context, system operators are
primarily concerned with economically maintaining operational reliability.
The system is said to be in an operationally reliable state if generator dis-
patch targets and other controllable system resources are set such that the
supply-demand balance is met and so that the system can tolerate the failure
of a small number of components without jeopardizing continued operation,
known, for a single component failure, as the (N -1)-reliability criterion [1].
To achieve operational reliability, system operators have conventionally un-
dertaken three reliability functions: (i) system monitoring, (ii) contingency
analysis, and (iii) security-constrained optimal power flow (SCOPF) [13].
System monitoring consists of collecting and processing measurements, e.g.,
voltages, power injections, or breaker statuses, for use in real-time applica-
tions, e.g., state estimation. Contingency analysis harnesses the data from
system monitoring along with a system model to perform model-based dc
and ac power flow analyses to identify outages in the system that may cause
4Ancillary services are reliability products, e.g., spinning reserve, regulating reserve,
non-spinning reserve, the provision of which are intended to assists the system operator
with managing uncertainty in real-time operations (see, e.g. [25]).
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overloads on system equipment and thus compromise operational reliability.
The overloads identified by contingency analysis are utilized with system op-
erational constraints, LFs, and system model data to formulate the real-time
SCED—the formulation of the SCOPF used in real-time operations.
The SCED was first formulated more than 40 years ago [27]. Over the
years, SCED research has focused on improving computational speed and
incorporating additional system and reliability information, e.g., transient
stability constraints and remedial actions, into the problem formulation (see,
e.g., [28]). More recent developments in methods for improving SCED solu-
tion computational time have focused on reducing the size of the problem,
e.g., by eliminating unnecessary constraints (see e.g., [29]), or by decompos-
ing the problem into a series of less computationally burdensome subproblems
via methods such as Benders’ decomposition (see, e.g., [30]). Furthermore,
the introduction of market-based scheduling for electricity and reserves ne-
cessitates more complex formulations of the SCED (see, e.g., [31]). Also, in
the past two decades, improvements in optimization methods and the avail-
ability and economy of computational resources have driven a surge in the
exploration of probabilistic methods, e.g. stochastic OPF, for incorporating
reliability considerations into the SCED (see, e.g., [32]). In practical settings,
e.g., ISO/RTO operations, the deterministic, single-stage, linear formulation
of the SCED is in widespread use (see, e.g. [24, 25]).
Existing Approaches and Shortcomings. In order to perform conven-
tional contingency analysis, compute LFs, and formulate power flow, network
flow, and security constraints in the real-time SCED, the system operator re-
quires an up-to-date model of the ISO/RTO’s electricity system and that of
neighboring systems, which is typically derived from the output of a state
estimator. The state estimator-based model is vulnerable to errors due to nu-
merous phenomena, e.g., undetected changes in the internal system topology
and erroneous model parameters [33], as well as inaccurate representations of
neighboring systems [34]. Further, model line parameters errors can arise as
a result of assumptions made when computing model parameter values, e.g.,
the extent of line transposition and non-homogeneity in conductor material
due to partial facility upgrades/reconductoring [35]. Also, model parameter
values are impacted dynamically by natural phenomena, e.g., mutual con-
ductance, temperature, humidity, and ground conductance [36].
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The accuracy of conventional operational reliability processes, e.g., the se-
curity constraints identified through contingency analysis and the dispatch
targets and LMPs determined in the model-based real-time SCED, are cou-
pled with the accuracy of the system model and the sensitivities computed
from that system model and, as such, subject to the same vulnerabilities.
Inaccurate LFs and ISFs, contingency analysis, dispatch targets, and LMPs
have economic implications, e.g., sending incorrect local price signals and
over/under payment to resources, as well as system reliability implications,
e.g., failure to operate the system in an N -1 secure state which can lead to
unintended equipment overloads and outages [3].
Several approaches to identifying and handling erroneous data in state
estimation have been proposed (see, e.g., [4]). There has also been a great
deal of work on identifying topology errors using various means (e.g., state
estimation), see, e.g., [37, 38, 39]. Further, ISOs/RTOs update system model
data periodically as erroneous data is identified through ex-post analysis, e.g.,
the analysis of non-convergent state-estimator solutions, and reporting by
market participants (see, e.g., [40]). However, even with these error detection
and correction algorithms and processes in place, the potential for erroneous
model data and topological errors persists in real-time operations due to
continued reliance of many processes on a system model, and presents a
challenge to reliable and economic power system operations (see, e.g., [41]).
1.3 Contributions of the Thesis
In this thesis, we develop a set of measurement-based real-time operational
reliability tools aimed at eradicating the model-dependance of the conven-
tional real-time SCED and contingency analysis—the cornerstones of oper-
ational reliability. To fully eradicate the model-dependence of the SCED,
we develop a measurement-based approach to estimating LFs. Furthermore,
to extend the scope and effectiveness of operational reliability tools, we pro-
pose a generalized formulation of the line outage angle factors (LOAFs),
which form the basis of an operational reliability tool used to assess whether
tripped transmission lines can be safely reclosed, and, if necessary, to deter-
mine a set of least-cost redispatch actions to take to make reclosure possible.
In what follows, we describe the details of each of these contributions.
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1.3.1 Measurement-Based Marginal Loss Factors
We propose a measurement-based approach to the computation of LFs. Un-
like conventional LF computation approaches, ours does not rely on a model
of the system obtained oﬄine. Instead, we estimate the LFs using load and
generation measurements obtained from PMUs. Furthermore, the LFs esti-
mated using our approach do not depend on arbitrarily selected distributed
slack weights, i.e., our approach will produce LFs consistent with the re-
sponses of generators to load changes in real-time. In fact, our estimated LFs
enable us to learn the “true” distributed slack weights, which may be useful
for determining resource performance when providing ancillary services, e.g.,
regulating reserves. In addition, our approach harnesses the existing practice
to collect load and generator output measurements for use in market settle-
ments, although its implementation would require the frequency with which
such measurement are collected to be increased.
The deployment of our measurement-based LF approach in the real-time
SCED can eliminate the impacts of erroneous data on computed losses, which
can significantly improve the accuracy of the dispatch and LMPs resulting
from the market.
1.3.2 Outage Angle Monitoring Tools
We develop a set of effective and computationally efficient tools for use by
system operators in addressing the challenge of large line outage angle mon-
itoring and control. To develop these tools, we derive the LOAFs using a
linearized power flow model (computed without the dc assumptions) taking
a sensitivity-focused approach based on the angle factors (AFs) and ISFs.
Our approach harnesses the concept of the flow-canceling transaction (FCT)
used in the formulation of the sensitivity-based quantities commonly utilized
in contingency analysis, e.g., the line outage distribution factors (LODFs)
[42]. However, we generalize the FCT concept by including the impacts of
line losses in its derivation. Using our proposed approach, we are able to
compute the LOAF of any line from a single system topology—the outage-
free topology. In addition, we show how the LOAFs can be estimated using
PMU measurements. Finally, we show how the LOAFs can be used for (i) on-
line angle monitoring, (ii) representing angle-reliability considerations in the
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SCED via outage angle constraints, and (iii) to derive an angle component
of the LMP, which provides economic signals as to the buses at which active
power injections relieve and exacerbate large line outage angles. Such infor-
mation can be used to incentivize reliability-preserving behavior from market
participants. LOAFs can be deployed in both the real-time and day-ahead
market contexts.
1.3.3 Measurement-Based Real-Time Security-Constrained
Economic Dispatch
We propose a measurement-based approach to the real-time SCED with the
goal of overcoming the shortcomings of the model-based SCED described in
Section 1.2.3. The crux of our approach is the reformulation of the SCED
constraints using more accurate data—removing model-based quantities and
replacing them with measurement-based estimates of the same quantities.
Specifically, we reformulate three types of constraints: (i) the power balance
constraint; (ii) network flow constraints, and (iii) security constraints. In the
model-based SCED, (i) depends on the the model-based LFs and (ii) and (iii)
depend on model-based ISFs and sensitivities derived from ISFs. Instead of
relying on model-based LFs and ISFs, our approach utilizes our proposed
LF estimation approach, and a measurement-based method for estimating
ISFs similar to that described in [18] and [43]. Furthermore, we propose an
extended SCED which includes outage angle constraints, which, using our
estimation approach, can be formulated using sensitivities estimated from
PMU measurements.
By moving away from a model-based representation of the network, our
approach virtually eliminates the impacts of phenomena such as undetected
changes in system topology and erroneous model parameters on the real-
time SCED outcomes. Furthermore, by computing sensitivities directly from
measurements, the measurement-based SCED can be formulated without the
output of a topology processor and state estimator, which may be advanta-
geous for cases in which the state estimator fails to converge (see, e.g., [2, 41]).
Our measurement-based approach also removes the requirement to define an
arbitrary distributed slack bus policy in order to compute the ISFs, which
is a fundamental limitation of model-based ISFs. Finally, the measurement-
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based sensitivities can be used to enhance contingency selection, which, as
we show, can improved contingency analysis by identifying potential cases
of security constraint omission and commission due to model errors that will
subsequently impact the SCED formulation and solution.
1.4 Thesis Organization
In this section, we give an overview of the structure of the thesis; it is orga-
nized as follows:
Chapter 2. The model-based operational reliability tools presented through-
out the thesis make extensive use of: (i) the distributed slack bus power flow;
(ii) the generalized power flow sensitivities; and (iii) both linearized ac- and
dc-based active power flow sensitivities. Furthermore, these tools are im-
plemented primarily via variants of the real-time economic dispatch (ED)
process. Hence, in this chapter, we introduce these concepts as well as pro-
viding an introduction to the notation used throughout the thesis.
Chapter 3. The accurate representation of losses in the (typically linear)
real-time ED is of central importance to maintaining operational reliability
and ensuring accurate economic incentives are provided to market partic-
ipants. Conventionally, losses have been represented using LFs computed
from a model of the system obtained oﬄine and with respect to a pre-specified
distributed slack policy. However, owing to the dependence of such LFs on
a model of the system, which may contain errors, and the underlying slack
policy selection, the LFs computed with conventional methods may not be
accurate. In this chapter, we give an overview of the conventional approach
to computing LFs based on the distributed slack bus power flow, illustrating
the dependence of the computation on the distributed slack policy selection.
Then, we formulate a measurement-based approach to estimating the LFs,
which harnesses PMU measurements at loads and generators. Moreover, we
provide the results of case studies carried out to demonstrate the impacts
on market outcomes of erroneous LFs and the adaptability of the proposed
measurement-based LFs.
The work presented in this chapter was submitted for publication in [44].
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Chapter 4. The 2011 San Diego blackout brought to light the shortcomings
of existing operational reliability tools with regard to identifying and mitigat-
ing large line outage angles. However, since the blackout, no new approaches
to assessing line outage angles have appeared in the literature to address the
gaps in existing operational reliability tools exposed by the blackout. To the
contrary, the needs have only grown, with system operators echoing the calls
in the San Diego blackout after-the-fact assessment report to develop the
needed tools to assess the potential impacts of line outages on line outage
angles (see, e.g., [45]). In this chapter, we describe a generalized approach
to computing LOAFs based on existing power flow sensitivities that heeds
these calls. We demonstrate how our proposed LOAFs can be used to formu-
late tools for monitoring outage angles, as well as those for mitigating them
via manual dispatch decisions and systematically and economically via an
extended real-time ED. Furthermore, we show how the measurement-based
approach used to compute LFs can likewise be used to compute LOAFs from
PMU measurements alone, i.e., without the need of a system model.
The work presented in this chapter was published in [46] and has been
submitted for publication in [47].
Chapter 5. The real-time SCED is the primary tool used by system oper-
ators to maintain operational reliability. Via the SCED, system operators
determine generator set points and LMPs that, in theory, meet the N -1
security criterion in the most economic manner possible. However, the con-
ventional SCED formulation depends heavily on sensitivities computed from
a model of the system: LFs and ISFs, as well as sensitivities derived from
ISFs. Furthermore, the process of contingency analysis, which drives the
construction of the set of reliability constraints that will be included in each
SCED formulation, also depends on the availability of an accurate system
model. If the system model proves to be inaccurate, the dispatch targets
and LMPs may also be inaccurate, which can cause reliability issues, e.g., a
failure to achieve the N -1 security criterion, and economic issues, e.g., the
inappropriate distribution of payments among market participants.
In this chapter we address these issues by bringing together the LF estima-
tion approach proposed in this thesis with an approach to estimating ISFs
in order to formulate a measurement-based SCED. The formulation of our
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measurement-based SCED does not require access to an accurate model of
the system, rather we estimate the sensitivities used in the SCED formulation
via PMU measurements. In doing so, we overcome the challenges with the
conventional SCED described above. We demonstrate the extent to which
modeling errors can impact the SCED and that to which our measurement-
based SCED can alleviate those impacts with a series of case studies.
The work presented in this chapter was published in [48] and [49].
Chapter 6. In this chapter, we conclude the thesis with a summary of the
contributions.
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CHAPTER 2
PRELIMINARIES
In this chapter, we give an overview of some power system modeling funda-
mentals that will be used in the subsequent chapters to derive model-based
operational reliability tools, which we will use as a basis of comparison for
our proposed tools. First, we introduce the distributed slack bus power flow.
Then, using the distributed slack bus power flow, we derive the fundamental
power flow sensitivities relating the changes in bus voltages, voltage angles
and system-wide active power mismatch to changes in the active and reac-
tive power injections. Additionally, we derived the injection shift factor (ISF)
matrix, which is used extensively in real-time operations to represent active
power flows. We also introduce the basic real-time economic dispatch (ED)
formulation and the notation that we use throughout the thesis.
2.1 Introduction
The operational reliability tools presented in this thesis rely heavily on two
fundamental power system concepts. The first concept is the the distributed
slack bus power flow formulation (see, e.g., [50]). In this power flow formu-
lation, the active power balance is maintained by distributing the slack, i.e.,
the mismatch between total active power generation and total active power
load plus losses, among several buses.1 The second concept is the fundamen-
tal power flow sensitivities. These sensitivities provide the total variation
in the power system state vector (i.e., the vector of voltage angles, voltage
magnitudes, and active power mismatch) with respect to active and reactive
power bus injections and are the basis for the derivation of other widely used
sensitivities, e.g., marginal loss factors (LFs) and ISFs.
1We will show that the conventional single slack-bus formulation is a particular case of
the more general one presented here.
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Furthermore, as stated previously, market scheduling tools are critically
important to system operators in their pursuit of operational reliability. To
this end, we give an overview of the basic scheduling problem solved by sys-
tem operators in the real-time setting: the so-called real-time ED. We build
on this basic market scheduling problem throughout the thesis to formulate
our proposed operational reliability tools.
2.2 Distributed Slack Bus Power Flow Formulation
Consider a system with N buses indexed by N = {1, . . . , N}. Let Vn and
θn denote the voltage magnitude and angle, respectively, at a bus n, and
define V = [V1, . . . , VN ]
T and θ = [θ1, . . . , θN ]
T , with θ1 = 0 (i.e., we take
bus 1 to be the angle reference bus). Additionally, let L = {`1, . . . , `L},
|L| = L, where each `l is an ordered pair (n,m), n,m ∈ N , representing a
transmission line between buses n and m, with the convention that positive
active power flow on such a line is in the direction from n to m. Moreover,
assume that there are G generators indexed by G = {1, . . . , G}, D loads
indexed by D = {1, . . . , D}, and let Gn ⊆ G denote the subset of generators
at bus n ∈ N , and let Dm ⊆ D denote the subset of loads at bus m ∈ N .
Throughout the thesis, we use the terms pre-allocation and schedule to
make a distinction between the generator (load) output (demand) before
and after, respectively, the system-wide losses (which are not known a priori)
have been allocated to generators and loads. Let P˜ gi (P
g
i ) denote the pre-
allocation (schedule) output of generator i ∈ G, with the convention that
P˜ gi , P
g
i > 0 if the generator injects active power into the system. Similarly,
let P˜ dv (P
d
v ) denote the pre-allocation (schedule) demand, with the convention
that P˜ dv , P
d
v > 0 if the load withdraws active power from the system. Further,
let Q˜gi (Q
g
i ) denote the pre-allocation (schedule) reactive output of generator
i ∈ G, with the convention that Q˜gi , Qgi > 0 if the generator injects reactive
power into the system, and Q˜dv (Q
d
v) denote the pre-allocation (schedule)
reactive consumption of load v ∈ D, with the convention that Q˜dv (Qdv) if the
load withdraws reactive power from the system.
Then, define, for each bus n ∈ N , the pre-allocation and schedule net
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active power injections, respectively, as
P˜n =
∑
i∈Gn
P˜ gi −
∑
v∈Dn
P˜ dv , (2.1)
Pn =
∑
i∈Gn
P gi −
∑
v∈Dn
P dv , (2.2)
and the pre-allocation and schedule reactive power injections as
Q˜n =
∑
i∈Gn
Q˜gi −
∑
v∈Dn
Q˜dv, (2.3)
Qn =
∑
i∈Gn
Qgi −
∑
v∈Dn
Qdv. (2.4)
Moreover, define the vector of pre-allocation (schedule) net injections at all
buses as P˜ = [P˜1, . . . , P˜N ]
T (P = [P1, . . . , PN ]
T ) and those of pre-allocation
(schedule) reactive net injections as Q˜ = [Q˜1, . . . , Q˜N ]
T (Q = [Q1, . . . , QN ]
T ).
The distributed slack bus power flow formulation requires the selection
of a distributed slack policy [14], which consists of specifying a vector of
distributed slack weights, α = [α1, . . . , αN ]
T , αi ∈ R, satisfying 1TNα = 1,
where 1N is the N -dimensional all-ones vector. These weights determine the
manner in which the active power mismatch due to losses and discrepancies
between total pre-allocation generation and load—the so-called slack, which
we denote by pm— will be balanced at each bus n ∈ N . Then, we have
that the relationship between the pre-allocation and scheduled net active
and reactive power injection vectors is given by
P = P˜ + pmα, (2.5)
and
Q = Q˜+ qm, (2.6)
where qm defines the allocation of reactive power at voltage-controlled buses
that adhere to some specified voltage control policy, which is typically de-
termined implicitly in the power flow problem by making the conventional
assumption that the voltages remain constant at such buses (see, e.g., [13]).
Utilizing the quantities defined in (2.1)–(2.6), the steady-state behavior of
the power system can be described by the distributed slack bus power flow
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equations as follows: [
P˜
Q˜
]
−
[
p(θ, V )− pmα
q(θ, V )− qm
]
= 0, (2.7)
where
p(θ, V ) = [p1(θ, V ), . . . , pN(θ, V )]
T ,
q(θ, V ) = [q1(θ, V ), . . . , qN(θ, V )]
T ,
with
pn(θ, V ) =
∑
j∈N
VnVj(G[n, j] cos(θn− θj) +B[n, j] sin(θn− θj)), n = 1, . . . , N,
qn(θ, V ) =
∑
j∈N
VnVj(G[n, j] sin(θn − θj)−B[n, j] cos(θn − θj)), n = 1, . . . , N,
where B[n, j] = B[j, n],2 and B[n, j] and G[n, j] are, respectively, the real
and imaginary parts of the (n, j)th entry of the bus admittance matrix.
Moreover, summing the active power equations in (2.7) yields the following
expression for the active power mismatch:
pm =
∑
n∈N
αnpm = P
`(θ, V )−
∑
n∈N
P˜n, (2.8)
where
P `(θ, V ) =
∑
n∈N
pn(θ, V ) =
∑
n∈N
∑
j∈N
VnVjG[n, j] cos(θn − θj)
are the system-wide losses.
We note that if α is selected such that αn = 1 for n = 1 and zero otherwise,
i.e., bus 1 picks up the slack, then, from (2.5) and (2.7), we have that
Pn =
{
P˜n + pm = pn(θ, V ) for n = 1,
P˜n = pn(θ, V ) ∀n ∈ N \ {1}.
With such an α, P˜1 can be selected arbitrarily and (2.7) is equivalent to the
2The assumption that B[n, j] = B[j, n] is equivalent to assuming that there are no
phase-shifting transformers in the system.
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conventional single-slack-bus power flow formulation (see, e.g., [13]).
Finally, we can compactly write the power flow equations in (2.7) as follows:
g(x, P˜, Q˜) =
[
P˜
Q˜
]
−
[
p(θ, V )− pmα
q(θ, V )− qm
]
= 0, (2.9)
where x = [θ2, . . . , θN , V1, . . . , VN , pm]
T , and g(·, ·, ·) is assumed to be contin-
uously differentiable with respect to x, P˜ , and Q˜.
2.3 Fundamental Power Flow Sensitivities
The fundamental power flow sensitivities relate the changes in the state vec-
tor, x, to changes in the pre-allocation bus injections of active and reactive
power, including the impacts of the distributed slack and voltage control poli-
cies applied in the system. As demonstrated throughout this thesis, these
sensitivities are the basis for the derivation of the other widely used power
flow sensitivities, e.g. LFs and ISFs.
Suppose the system defined in (2.9) is operating at the point (x0, P0, Q0),
i.e., g(x0, P0, Q0) = 0, and, without loss of generality, assume that pm = 0,
qm = 0 at (x0, P0, Q0). Let P˜ = P0 + ∆P
′, Q˜ = Q0 + ∆Q′, and x =
x0 + ∆x
′, where ∆P ′ (∆Q′) is an active (reactive) power perturbation in
the pre-allocation quantities, which in this case happen to coincide with the
scheduled quantities since pm = qm = 0, and ∆x
′ is the system response to
such a perturbation prior to control actions, which we discuss below. Then,
assuming ∆x′, ∆P ′, and ∆Q′ are sufficiently small, we can approximate
g(x, P˜, Q˜) as
g(x, P˜, Q˜) ≈ g(x0, P0, Q0) + J∆x′ + C∆P ′ +D∆Q′, (2.10)
with
J =
∂g
∂x
∣∣∣∣
x0
=
[
−∂p
∂θ
|x0 − ∂p∂V |x0 α
−∂q
∂θ
|x0 − ∂q∂V |x0 0
]
,
C =
∂g
∂P˜
=
[
IN×N
0N×N
]
, D =
∂g
∂Q˜
=
[
0N×N
IN×N
]
,
where IN×N (0N×N) is the N ×N identity (all-zeros) matrix. By definition,
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g(x0, P0, Q0) = 0 and g(x, P˜, Q) = 0. Thus, from (2.10) we have that
0 ≈ J∆x′ + C∆P ′ +D∆Q′. (2.11)
Next, assume that J , which is the Jacobian of the power flow equations, is
invertible around (x0, P0, Q0). Accordingly, we may solve (2.11) for ∆x
′ to
arrive at
∆x′ ≈ −J−1C∆P ′ − J−1D∆Q′, (2.12)
which describes the pre-control-response change in x with respect to the per-
turbation (∆P ′,∆Q′). However, in a power system, a perturbation (∆P ′,∆Q′)
provokes a response by the controls in order to: (i) maintain the active power
balance and (ii) maintain the voltage-controlled bus voltages at constant val-
ues (under the conventional power flow assumptions). Let ∆P ′′ and ∆Q′′
be, respectively, the allocations of active and reactive power to each bus to
achieve (i) and (ii),3 and let ∆x′′ be the additional change in x due to ∆P ′′
and ∆Q′′, which, assuming ∆P ′′ and ∆Q′′ are sufficiently small, is given by
∆x′′ ≈ −J−1C∆P ′′ − J−1D∆Q′′. (2.13)
Then, the total variation in x due to the perturbation and control response
can be expressed as follows:
∆x = ∆x′ + ∆x′′. (2.14)
By substituting (2.12) and (2.13) into (2.14), we arrive at
∆x ≈ −J−1C(∆P ′ + ∆P ′′)− J−1D(∆Q′ + ∆Q′′). (2.15)
Now, partition the inverse Jacobian as follows:
J−1 =
 −F −M−E −H
−rT −wT
 , (2.16)
where F,M ∈ R(N−1)×N , E,H ∈ RN×N , r, w ∈ RN ; then, from (2.15) and
3We note that the selection of a voltage policy fully specifies the reactive power mis-
match that will be allocated to each voltage-controlled bus, i.e., qm = ∆Q
′′.
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(2.16) we conclude that
∆θ ≈ F (∆P ′ + ∆P ′′) +M(∆Q′ + ∆Q′′), (2.17)
∆V ≈ E(∆P ′ + ∆P ′′) +H(∆Q′ + ∆Q′′), (2.18)
and
∆pm ≈ rT (∆P ′ + ∆P ′′) + wT (∆Q′ + ∆Q′′). (2.19)
For notational simplicity and without loss of generality, suppose the buses
are numbered such that voltage-controlled buses are numbered first followed
by the non-voltage-controlled buses, and define N c and Nu to be the num-
ber of voltage-controlled and non-voltage-controlled buses, respectively, with
N c +Nu = N . Then, partition E, H, and M as follows:
E =
[
Ecc Ecu
Euc Euu
]
, H =
[
Hcc Hcu
Huc Huu
]
, (2.20)
and M =
[
Mcc Mcu
Muc Muu
]
, (2.21)
where the subscripts c and u indicate those elements of the matrices as-
sociated with voltage-controlled and non-voltage-controlled buses, respec-
tively, and Ecc, Hcc, Mcc ∈ RNc×Nc , Ecu, Hcu, Mcu ∈ RNc×Nu , Euc, Huc,
Muc ∈ RNu×Nc , and Euu, Huu, Muu ∈ RNu×Nu .
Next, partition ∆V = [∆V Tc , ∆V
T
u ]
T and ∆Q′′ = [∆Q′′c
T , ∆Q′′u
T ]T and
observe that ∆Vc = 0Nc and ∆Q
′′
u = 0Nu due to (ii) above, where 0Nc and
0Nu are N
c- and Nu-dimensional all-zeros vectors, respectively. Then, from
(2.18), we have that
0Nc ≈ Ec(∆P ′ + ∆P ′′) +Hc∆Q′ +Hcc∆Q′′c , (2.22)
where Ec = [ Ecc Ecu ] and Hc = [ Hcc Hcu ].
Furthermore, from (2.12), the we have that the active power mismatch
that arises due to ∆P ′ and ∆Q′ is given by
∆p′m ≈ rT∆P ′ + wT∆Q′. (2.23)
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However, by definition, the active power control response is given by
∆P ′′ = ∆p′mα. (2.24)
Thus, by substituting (2.23) into (2.24), we arrive at
∆P ′′ = α(rT∆P ′ + wT∆Q′). (2.25)
Moreover, by solving for Hcc∆Q
′′
c in (2.22) we obtain
Hcc∆Q
′′
c ≈ −Ec(∆P ′ + ∆P ′′)−Hc∆Q′. (2.26)
Then, by substituting (2.25) into (2.26) and rearranging, we obtain the re-
active power control response required to meet the specified voltage policy
∆Q′′c ≈ U∆P ′ +W∆Q′, (2.27)
where
U = −H−1cc (Ec + EcαrT ),
and
W = −H−1cc (Hc + EcαwT ),
and the existence of H−1cc is guaranteed by the invertibility of J and the
matrix inversion lemma (see, e.g., [51]).
Now, by substituting (2.25) and (2.27) into (2.17) and rearranging, we
arrive at
∆θ ≈ Ω∆P ′ + Ωq∆Q′, (2.28)
where
Ω = F + FαrT +Mc∗U, (2.29)
Ωq = M + FαwT +Mc∗W ), (2.30)
and Mc∗ = [M
T
cc,M
T
uc]
T ; Ω (Ωq) is the N × N matrix of model-based active
(reactive) power angle factors (AFs), which will be utilized in Chapter 4
to derive the LOAFs. Furthermore, the components of Ω (Ωq) have the
following intuitive physical interpretation: (i) F (M) is the portion of ∆θ
attributable directly to the perturbation ∆P ′ (∆Q′); (ii) FαrT (FαwT ) is the
portion of ∆θ attributable to the system control response to the perturbation
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∆P ′ (∆Q′) to maintain the active power balance plus changes in the active
power losses; and (iii) Mc∗U (Mc∗W ) is the portion of ∆θ attributable to the
system control response to the perturbation ∆P ′ (∆Q′) to maintain voltages
according to the specified voltage policy, e.g., constant voltages, at voltage-
controlled buses.
Additionally, by substituting (2.25) and (2.27) into (2.18) and rearranging,
we arrive at
∆V ≈ Π∆P ′ + Πq∆Q′, (2.31)
where
Π = E + EαrT +Hc∗U,
Πq = H + EαwT +Hc∗W,
and Hc∗ = [H
T
cc, H
T
uc]
T ; we note that ∆Vc = 0 in (2.31) in accordance with the
conventional power flow voltage assumption, a proof of which we provide in
Appendix A. Moreover, as in the case of the AFs, the components of Π (Πq)
have the following intuitive physical interpretation: (i) E (H) is the portion of
∆V attributable directly to the perturbation ∆P ′ (∆Q′); (ii) EαrT (HαwT )
is the portion of ∆V attributable to the system control response to the
perturbation ∆P ′ (∆Q′) to maintain the active power balance plus changes
in the active power losses; and (iii) Hc∗U (Hc∗W ) is the portion of ∆V
attributable to the system control response to the perturbation ∆P ′ (∆Q′)
to maintain voltages according to the specified voltage policy at voltage-
controlled buses.
Then, by substituting (2.25) and (2.27) into (2.19) and rearranging, we
have also that
∆pm ≈ γT∆P ′ + (γq)T∆Q′, (2.32)
where
γT = rT + rTαrT + wTc U,
(γq)T = wT + rTαwT + wTcW,
and w = [wTc , w
T
u ]
T . We note also that ∆pm = 0 in (2.32), as required
by (2.5) after the active power control actions have taken place to update
the pre-allocation quantities to schedule quantities, and a proof of which
we provide in Appendix A. Moreover, the components of γ (γq) have an
analogous physical interpretation to that given for (2.28) and (2.31).
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Finally, by combining (2.28), (2.31), and (2.32), we have that the total
variation in ∆x with respect to a perturbation in the pre-allocation is given
by:
∆x ≈ Θ∆P ′ + Θq∆Q′, (2.33)
where
Θ =
 ΩΠ
γT
 , Θq =
 Ω
q
Πq
(γq)T
 .
The quantities Θ and Θq are the fundamental power flow sensitivities.
2.4 Line Flow Sensitivities
The computation of the impacts on line active power flows of changes in bus
active power injections, represented by the ISFs, is of pivotal importance
for online tools used to maintain operational reliability, e.g., the real-time
ED. To derive the ISFs, define P fl,n = hl,n(x), where hl,n : R2N → RL, to be
the active power flow injected into line `l at the bus n end, which, without
loss of generality, we will assume is the from bus. Then, we can describe the
variation in the active power flow, denoted by ∆P fl,n, in terms of the variation
in ∆x, derived in (2.33), for ∆x small, as follows:
∆P fl,n ≈ sTl,n∆x, (2.34)
where sl,n =
∂hl,n
∂x
|x0 . Next, by substituting (2.33) into (2.34) and rearranging,
we obtain
∆P fl,n ≈ Ψl∆P ′ + Ψql∆Q′, (2.35)
where
Ψl = −sTl,n(J−1C + J−1CαrT +Bc∗U), (2.36)
Ψql = −sTl,n(J−1D + J−1DαwT +Bc∗W ), (2.37)
and Bc∗ is a matrix composed of the columns of J
−1D corresponding to
voltage-controlled buses. Furthermore, let Ψ denote the L×N ISF matrix,
the rows of which are computed using (2.35). Each entry of Ψ, denoted by
Ψ[l, n], provides the sensitivity of the active power injected at the from end
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of line `l ∈ L to an injection at bus n that is withdrawn, along with the
change in losses introduced by the injection, according to the distributed
slack policy.
In the market context, the ISFs computed with (2.36) are typically further
simplified using the dc assumptions. To derive these dc-model-based ISFs, let
A = [a1, . . . , an, . . . , aN ] denote the transmission network incidence matrix,
where an is an L-dimensional column vector the lth entry of which is equal to
1 if bus n is the from bus of line l, −1 if bus n is the to bus of line l, and zero
otherwise. Further, let b denote the L-dimensional column vector of branch
susceptances, and define the diagonal L × L branch susceptance matrix as
Bb = diag{b}, where diag{·} denotes a diagonal matrix such that Bb[l, l] = bl,
∀l. Then, define the N×N nodal susceptance matrix as B = ATBbA, and the
augmented nodal susceptance matrix by Bα = [B˜ α], where B˜ is the nodal
susceptance matrix absent the column corresponding to the specified angle
reference bus and α is the vector of distributed slack weights. Furthermore,
recall that θ1 is the specified angle reference and define A˜ = [a2, . . . aN , 0L],
where 0L is the L-dimensional all-zeros vector.
Under the dc assumptions, Ψ, can be calculated directly from the network
connectivity, parameters, and distributed slack weights as follows [13]:
Ψ = BbA˜B
−1
α (IN×N − α1TN). (2.38)
With the dc assumptions and dc-model-based ISFs, we can also define the
PTDFs and LODFs, which are used extensively to model outages in real-time
operations. The N×N matrix of PTDFs for a line `l, denoted by Φl, provides
the sensitivity of the active power flow on line `l to active power transactions
between buses in the system, e.g., the (n,m)th element of Φl, denoted by
Φl[n,m], gives us the proportion of a real power transaction injected at bus
n and withdrawn at bus m that flows over line `l. The PTDF for a line
`l with respect to an injection at a bus n that is withdrawn at a bus m is
calculated directly from the ISFs as follows [13]:
Φl[n,m] = Ψ[l, n]−Ψ[l,m]. (2.39)
The L × L matrix of LODFs provides the proportion of the pre-outage
active power flow on each line `l that flows on each in-service line `u in the
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system in the event of the outage of line `l. The LODF for a line `u with
respect to the outage of a separate line `l = (n,m) is calculated from the
PTDFs in (2.39) of the respective lines by [13]
Ξ[u, l] :=
Φu[n,m]
1− Φl[n,m] . (2.40)
2.5 Real-Time Economic Dispatch
The real-time ED is a widely used, optimal power flow (OPF)-based market
scheduling tool that has three primary components: (i) power flow and net-
work flow constraints obtained from a model of the system; (ii) equipment
constraints, e.g., generator power output limits; and (iii) the objective, typi-
cally the maximization of social surplus4 or minimization of generator costs,
commonly quadratic or piecewise-linear functions (see, e.g., [13], [27], [53]).
Consider the system defined in Section 2.2 and suppose it is operating with
a nominal load, P d0 ∈ RD, nominal dispatch, P g0 ∈ RG, and corresponding
nominal line flows, P f0 ∈ RL, and losses, P `0 ∈ R. Furthermore, suppose we
have a forecast change in each bus load, denoted by ∆P d ∈ RD, over the
time horizon of interest for the real-time ED—typically five minutes. The
aim of the real-time ED is to determine the changes in the generator dispatch
targets, which we denote by ∆P g ∈ RG, required to economically meet the
forecast changes in the loads plus the change in system-wide losses, which
we denote by ∆P ` ∈ R, and ensure system equipment and transmission
constraints are met [53].
For a number of computational and practical reasons, the conventional
real-time ED is commonly formulated using a simplified OPF formulation,
referred to as the dc-OPF [54]. The dc assumptions result in a linear ap-
proximation of the nonlinear power balance and network flow constraints.
There are two primary approaches to the representation of the network
in the dc-OPF: (i) the conventional “B-θ” approach; and (ii) the ISF-based
approach [54]. In this thesis, we focus on the ISF-based approach due to its
4The social surplus, also referred to as the economic surplus, is defined to be the sum
of: (i) the consumer surplus, which is sum over all buyers of the difference between each
buyer’s willingness to pay and the price paid by that buyer; and (ii) the producer surplus,
which is the sum over all sellers of the difference between the price received by each seller
and that seller’s offer price [52].
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widespread use by ISOs/RTOs in practical market operations.
In the ISF-based network representation conventionally deployed to for-
mulate the ED in a market setting, the voltage angles are not explicitly
represented, rather the bus power balance and power flowing on each line
are written in terms of the system-wide power balance, the linear flow sensi-
tivities, and the bus injections. Under this representation, the system-wide
power balance constraint is given by
1TG∆P
g − 1TD∆P d −∆P ` = 0, (2.41)
where 1G and 1D are all-ones vectors of dimensions G and D, respectively;
and ∆P ` is the change in system-wide losses, which typically takes the form
of an LF-based loss model [14]; we will derive such a model in Chapter 3.
The ISF matrix provides the basis of the ISF-based dc-OPF network flow
representation. Denote by ∆P the vector of bus net active power injection
changes and by P0 the vector of nominal bus net active power injections, each
defined according to (2.1) with ∆P d, ∆P g and P d0 , P
g
0 , respectively. Then,
using the ISF matrix from (2.38), we define the vector of incremental line
flows in terms of the bus injections as
∆P f = Ψ∆P, (2.42)
which are bounded above and below by the line upper and lower incremental
limits, denoted by ∆P¯ f = P¯ f − P f0 and ∆¯P
f =
¯
P f − P f0 , respectively.
Denote by Oi(·) the offer function of generator i and by Bdv(·) the bid
function of demand v, the arguments of which are ∆P gi and ∆P
d
v , respectively.
The objective of the real-time ED is the maximization of the social surplus,
[53],5 which is defined as
S (∆P g,∆P d) =
∑
v∈D
Bv(P
d
v,0 + ∆P
d
v )−
∑
i∈G
Oi(P
g
i,0 + ∆P
g
i ), (2.43)
where P dv,0 and P
g
i,0 are, respectively, the vth and ith components of P
d
0 and
P g0 .
Combining the objective in (2.43) with the constraints that result from the
5If we make the additional assumption that loads have an infinite willingness to pay, i.e.,
demand is completely inelastic, then the maximization of the social surplus is equivalent
to the minimization of generator cost.
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power balance and network flow expressions in (2.41) and (2.42), respectively,
we formulate the real-time ED problem as follows:
max
∆P g ,∆P d
S (∆P g,∆P d) (2.44a)
s.t.
1TG∆P
g − 1TD∆P d −∆P ` = 0↔ λr (2.44b)
¯
P g ≤ P g0 + ∆P g ≤ P¯ g (2.44c)
¯
P d ≤ P d0 + ∆P d ≤ P¯ d (2.44d)
∆
¯
P f ≤ Ψ∆P ≤ ∆P¯ f ↔
¯
µf , µ¯f (2.44e)
where
¯
P g (P¯ g) and
¯
P d, (P¯ d) are the G- and D-dimensional vectors of gener-
ator and demand lower (upper) limits, respectively; ∆P ` = ΛT∆P g, where
Λ ∈ RN is the vector of LFs and for notational simplicity we assume G = N ;
and λr,
¯
µf , and µ¯f are the dual variables of their respective constraints, also
referred to as shadow prices due to their well-known economic interpreta-
tion [53].6 We note that, in practical applications, the real-time ED also
includes so-called security constraints, which enforce reliability standards.
However, we leave the discussion of such security constraints for Chapter 5.
The primary outcome of the real-time ED is the set of generator dispatch
instructions, ∆P g.
The LMPs are an important additional outcome of the real-time market
clearing process and serve two primary functions: (i) they provide location-
specific prices for energy supplied/consumed by resources in the system; (ii)
they provide the system operator with an indication of the existence of local-
ized scarcity due to network constraints. Though the LMPs are not a direct
result of the solution to (2.44), they may be calculated from the ISFs, the
LFs, and the shadow prices at the solution to (2.44) [50] as follows:
λ = 1Nλr + Ψ
T
(
µ¯f −
¯
µf
)
+ Λλr. (2.45)
Now, define
λc = ΨT
(
µ¯f −
¯
µf
)
and λ` = Λλr,
to be the N -dimensional vectors representing the congestion and loss com-
6The shadow price of the system-wide power balance constraint, λr, is often referred
to as the system reference or energy price.
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ponents of the LMPs. Then, for each bus n, the LMP can be decomposed
into three components [50]:
λn = λr + λ
c
n + λ
`
n,
where λr is the energy component, which represents the cost to generate
the next MW from those generators that provide it; λcn is the congestion
component, which captures the additional costs to deliver the next MW to
bus n associated with transmission congestion-driven dispatch limitations;
and λ`n is the loss component, which accounts for the location-differentiated
cost of losses associated with serving the next MW at bus n.
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CHAPTER 3
MEASUREMENT-BASED LOSS FACTOR
ESTIMATION
In this chapter, we propose a measurement-based approach to the estimation
of marginal loss factors (LFs), which are conventionally computed from the
power flow Jacobian. Our approach circumvents the shortcomings of model-
based LF computation approaches by utilizing PMU measurements for online
LF estimation so as to reflect real-time operating conditions and adapt to
changing system conditions. These strengths of the proposed measurement-
based LF estimation approach can be harnessed to enhance the real-time
scheduling process and the computation of real-time locational marginal
prices (LMPs).
3.1 Introduction
In a power system, the allocation of the additional energy that must be
generated to account for losses and the costs associated with providing such
energy are critical components of effective market-based electricity scheduling
procedures. Conventionally, model-based approaches, e.g., penalty factors,
the B-coefficients, and, more recently, LFs, have been used to represent losses
in such scheduling procedures.
Loss factors are sensitivities of the system-wide active power losses to
changes in the bus active power injections, assuming the change in injec-
tion is balanced by a single slack bus or set of slack buses. Model-based
LFs are derived from the power flow Jacobian [13], the computation of which
requires an up-to-date system model, typically obtained oﬄine. As such, the
accuracy of the LFs is coupled with the accuracy of the underlying system
model and the inaccuracies in the system model extend to the model-based
LFs. Furthermore, the LF computation requires the a priori specification
of distributed slack weights, which define the distribution of the power mis-
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match and losses among the buses in the system necessary to maintain the
system-wide power balance. Such distributed slack weights are typically se-
lected based on the bus load distribution or generator output distribution
(see, e.g., [15, 16]).
Loss factors are primarily used in: (i) market scheduling procedures for
setting generator dispatch targets, and (ii) the computation of locational
marginal prices (LMPs) (see, e.g., [15, 16]). The LFs, through the dispatch
targets and LMPs, also impact the distribution of payments among mar-
ket participants. Inaccurate LFs have physical implications, e.g., changing
the dispatch targets of generators which may raise reliability concerns, and
economic implications, e.g., changing the LMPs and causing an incorrect
distribution of market payments.
In this chapter, we propose a measurement-based approach to the compu-
tation of LFs. Unlike conventional LF computation approaches, ours does
not rely on a model of the system obtained oﬄine. Instead, we estimate the
LFs using load and generation measurements obtained from PMUs. Further-
more, the LFs estimated using our approach do not depend on arbitrarily
selected distributed slack weights, i.e., our approach will produce LFs con-
sistent with the responses of generators to load changes in real-time. Indeed,
our measurement-based estimation approach makes possible the calculation
of the “true” distributed slack weights. In addition, our approach harnesses
the existing practice to collect load and generator output measurements for
use in market settlements.
3.2 Model-Based Loss Factor Computation
To derive conventional, model-based LFs, we focus on the active power mis-
match, pm, and consider again the power system outlined in (2.9). Suppose
the system is operating at the point (x0, P0, Q0), i.e., g(x0, P0, Q0) = 0 and
without loss of generality, assume that pm = 0, qm = 0 at (x0, P0, Q0). Then,
let P˜ = P0 + ∆P
′, Q˜ = Q0 + ∆Q′, and x = x0 + ∆x′, where ∆P ′ (∆Q′) is an
active (reactive) power perturbation in the pre-allocation quantities, which
happen to coincide with the scheduled quantities, and ∆x′ is the system re-
sponse to such a perturbation prior to control actions. From (2.12), we have
that the pre-control-response active power mismatch, that arises due to the
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perturbation (∆P ′, ∆Q′) is given by
∆p′m ≈ rT∆P ′ + wT∆Q′. (3.1)
However, to fully characterize the losses, we must also consider the loss im-
pact of the voltage control policy. The voltage control policy impacts the
losses that arise as a result of the perturbation (∆P ′, ∆Q′) via the provi-
sion of reactive power to meet the voltage control objective, which is not
captured in (3.1). To capture these impacts on the losses, we define the
post-voltage-control active power mismatch as follows:
∆p˜m ≈ rT∆P ′ + wT∆Q′ + wTc ∆Q′′c . (3.2)
Then, by substituting (2.27) into (3.2), we arrive at the post-voltage-
control active power mismatch with respect to the perturbation (∆P ′, ∆Q′):
∆p˜m ≈ yT∆P ′ + (yq)T∆Q′, (3.3)
where y = (rT + wTc U)
T and yq = (rT + wTcW )
T .
Recall that the active (reactive) LFs are the sensitivities of the system-wide
losses with respect to changes in the pre-allocation net active (reactive) power
injection at each bus, assuming the change is balanced by a pre-specified bus,
i.e., there is a single slack bus, or set of buses, i.e., the slack is distributed
among several buses. Now, let ∆P ` be the change in the system-wide losses,
P `(θ, V ), due to the perturbation in the pre-allocation, (∆P ′, ∆Q′). Then,
define the active and reactive power perturbation LFs for a bus n, respec-
tively, by
Λn =
∂P `(θ, V )
∂P˜n
,
and
Λqn =
∂P `(θ, V )
∂Q˜n
.
Moreover, let ∆p˜m,n (∆p˜
q
m,n) be the portion of the variation ∆p˜m attributable
to ∆P ′n (∆Q
′
n) such that
∆p˜m =
∑
n∈N
∆p˜m,n + ∆p˜
q
m,n. (3.4)
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Then, from (2.8) and (3.4), it follows that
∆P ` =
∑
n∈N
(
∆P ′n + ∆p˜m,n + ∆p˜
q
m,n
)
. (3.5)
Further, by rearranging the right side of (3.5) and assuming that ∆p˜m,n ≈
∂p˜m
∂P˜n
∆P ′n (∆p˜
q
m,n ≈ ∂p˜m∂Q˜n∆Q
′
n) for ∆P
′
n (∆Q
′
n) small, we obtain
∆P ` ≈
∑
n∈N
(
1 +
∂p˜m
∂P˜n
)
∆P ′n +
∂p˜m
∂Q˜n
∆Q′n. (3.6)
From (3.3) and (3.6), we conclude that the active and reactive power model-
based LF for each bus n with respect to a chosen α and voltage control policy
are, respectively, given by
Λn ≈ 1 + yn, (3.7)
and
Λqn ≈ yqn, (3.8)
where yn (y
q
n) is the nth element of the vector y (y
q). Current market schedul-
ing practice is concerned only with the scheduling of active power. Thus, in
practice, only the active power LFs are used. Moreover, in operations these
LFs are recomputed periodically via (3.7) using an operator-selected α and
an ac power flow solution based on state estimator output (see, e.g., [15, 16]).
3.3 Measurement-Based Loss Factor Estimation
The conventional, model-based LFs defined in (3.7) are not ideal because
they depend on the availability of an up-to-date model of the system. Fur-
thermore, they require the arbitrary selection of a distributed reference bus
and a voltage policy in the system, which may not be consistent with actual
operations.
In this section, we formulate our measurement-based approach to LF esti-
mation, which does not carry the above requirements. To this end, we focus
on the measured response of generators to changes in load injections (nec-
essary to maintain the system-wide power balance, including losses). If the
power system is to remain in operation, the power balance must be main-
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tained around-the-clock and thus the losses manifest themselves as the dif-
ference between the load injection changes and their corresponding generator
output changes.
3.3.1 Loss Factor Estimation
Suppose the active (reactive) power consumed by a load v at time t, P dv (t)
(Qdv(t)), varies by a small amount from time t to time t+∆t, ∆t > 0 and small,
to become P dv (t+ ∆t) (Q
d
v(t+ ∆t)), and define ∆P
d
v (t) = P
d
v (t+ ∆t)−P dv (t)
(∆Qdv(t) = Q
d
v(t+∆t)−Qdv(t)). Further, let ∆P g,pi,v (t) = P g,pi,v (t+∆t)−P g,pi,v (t)
be the response of generator i to the load v active power consumption change
∆P dv (t); then, define
Υp[v, i] =
∂P gi (t)
∂P dv (t)
≈ ∆P
g,p
i,v (t)
∆P dv (t)
. (3.9)
Moreover, let ∆P g,qi,v (t) = P
g,q
i,v (t+ ∆t)− P g,qi,v (t) be the response of generator
i to the load v reactive power consumption change ∆Qdv(t); then, define
Υq[v, i] =
∂P gi (t)
∂Qdv(t)
≈ ∆P
g,q
i,v (t)
∆Qdv(t)
. (3.10)
While ∆P g,pi,v (t) and ∆P
g,q
i,v (t) are not directly available through PMU mea-
surements, we can, however, measure the total change in generator i output
due to load changes at time t, ∆P gi (t). We observe that the variation in
the generator i output is due to the generator’s response to variations in the
active and reactive power of each load v:
∆P gi (t) = ∆P
g,p
i,1 (t) + · · ·+ ∆P g,pi,D(t) + ∆P g,qi,1 (t) + · · ·+ ∆P g,qi,D(t). (3.11)
Employing (3.9) and (3.10) together with (3.11) we obtain
∆P gi (t) ≈∆P d1 (t)Υp[1, i] + · · ·+ ∆P dD(t)Υp[D, i]
+∆Qd1(t)Υ
q[1, i] + · · ·+ ∆QdD(t)Υq[D, i].
Now suppose we have M + 1 sets of synchronized load and generation mea-
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surements, and let
∆P dv [k] = P
d
v [(k + 1)∆t]− P dv [k∆t],
∆Qdv[k] = Q
d
v[(k + 1)∆t]−Qdv[k∆t],
∆P gi [k] = P
g
i [(k + 1)∆t]− P gi [k∆t],
for k = 1, . . . ,M , and define
∆P dv =
[
∆P dv [1] · · · ∆P dv [k] · · · ∆P dv [M ]
]T
,
∆Qdv =
[
∆Qdv[1] · · · ∆Qdv[k] · · · ∆Qdv[M ]
]T
,
∆P gi = [∆P
g
i [1] · · · ∆P gi [k] · · · ∆P gi [M ]]T .
Furthermore, let
Υpi = [Υ[1, i], . . . ,Υ[v, i], . . . ,Υ[D, i]]
T ,
Υqi = [Υ
q[1, i], . . . ,Υq[v, i], . . . ,Υq[D, i]]T ,
Υi = [(Υ
p
i )
T (Υqi )
T ]T .
Then, clearly,
∆P gi =
[
∆P d1 · · · ∆P dv · · · ∆P dD · · · ∆Qd1 · · · ∆Qdv · · · ∆QdD
]
Υi. (3.12)
Define ∆P d =
[
∆P d1 · · · ∆P dv · · · ∆P dD
]
, ∆Qd =
[
∆Qd1 · · · ∆Qdv · · · ∆QdD
]
,
and ∆Sd = [(∆P d)T (∆Qd)T ]T . Then, the system in (3.12) becomes
∆P gi = ∆S
dΥi. (3.13)
If M ≥ 2D, then (3.13) is an overdetermined system. Moreover, assuming
Υi is approximately constant over the M + 1 measurements,
1 we can obtain
an estimate of Υi from least-squares error estimation (LSE) as follows:
Υˆi = ((∆S
d)T∆Sd)−1(∆Sd)T∆P gi . (3.14)
As an added benefit of the measurement-based estimation approach de-
1We provide an empirical analysis of this assumption in Appendix B.
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scribed above, a measurement-based estimate of the actual distributed slack
weight—sometimes referred to as the participation factor—for each generator
i can be computed from the results of (3.14) as follows:
αˆi =
Υˆ[v, i]∑
i∈G Υˆ[v, i]
, (3.15)
for an arbitrary v ∈ D.
Let Υˆ = [(Υˆp)T (Υˆq)T ]T be the 2D×G matrix of generator output to load
change sensitivity estimates, which we will use to derive the measurement-
based LFs. Consider a change in the loads at instant t, (∆P d(t), ∆Qd(t)),
for which we can write the corresponding change in system-wide losses as
∆P `(t) = 1TG∆P
g(t)− 1TD∆P d(t), (3.16)
where ∆P g(t) is the post-load-change response of the generators to load
change (∆P d(t), ∆Qd(t)) and 1G (1D) is an all-ones vector of dimension
G (D).
Now, by substituting (3.11) into (3.16) we arrive at
∆P `(t) =
∑
v∈D
(−∆P d(t) +
∑
i∈G
∆P gi,v(t) + ∆P
g,q
i,v (t)). (3.17)
For sufficiently small ∆P d(t), ∆Qd(t), and ∆P g(t), we can substitute (3.9)
and (3.10) into (3.17) and rearrange to obtain
∆P `(t) ≈
∑
v∈D
(
−1 +
∑
i∈G
Υˆp[v, i]
)
∆P dv (t) +
∑
v∈D
Υˆq[v, i])∆Qdv(t),
from which we conclude that the active power LFs are given by:
∂P `(t)
∂P d(t)
≈ −1D + Υˆp1G. (3.18)
Let Λ be the N -dimensional vector of active power LFs. Noting the rela-
tionship in (3.18) and the load injection sign convention adopted herein, and
assuming we have active and reactive power load measurements at each bus
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(i.e., D = N), an estimate of Λ, which we denote by Λˆg, can be written as
Λˆg = −(−1N + Υˆp1G). (3.19)
The LF estimates computed with (3.19) have an implicit generator slack
bus, i.e., they embody the responses of generators to changes in the loads
in the system. However, market processes are by-and-large concerned with
the selection of a least-cost generator dispatch to meet a fixed load forecast.
Thus, the LFs used in the market context are typically computed with re-
spect to a load slack bus. Suppose we have selected a distributed load slack
weight vector, α, e.g., using the bus load distribution. Then, we can com-
pute from the generator-referenced measurement-based LFs in (3.19) a close
approximation of the desired load-referenced LFs as follows:
Λˆ = Λˆg − 1NαT Λˆg. (3.20)
Unlike the model-based LFs computed with (3.7), the LFs computed with
(3.19) and (3.20) are not affected by incorrect model data or undetected
changes in system topology.
3.3.2 Practical Considerations for the LF Estimation
The estimation of the sensitivities in (3.14) used to compute the LFs requires
a complete set of data, i.e., M sets of load active and reactive demand and
generator output measurements, where M > 2D. Moreover, the LSE-based
approach gives equal weight to all measurements, regardless of their acquisi-
tion time. In practice, these aspects of the approach above may prove to be
impractical. To address this, similar to the ISF estimation approach in [18],
we propose the deployment of a weighted least squares (WLS) formulation
of (3.14) given by
ΥˆTi = ((∆S
d)TW (∆Sd))−1(∆Sd)TW∆P gi , (3.21)
where W is a weighting matrix that can be selected to give more weight
to recent measurements so as to track changing operating conditions and
minimize the impacts of erroneous measurements on the LF estimation.
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The WLS approach in (3.21) may be further improved by implementing
a recursive weighted least squares variant (see, e.g., [18]), which enables
the computation of updated estimates of the Υˆi as each set of measurements
arrives. In this chapter, we adopt the WLS approach in (3.21) with a diagonal
weighting matrix W , where W [k, k] = fM−k, f ∈ (0, 1]. Furthermore, our
observations from a number of tests carried out on IEEE test systems of
varying sizes, a subset of the results of which we furnish in Chapter 5, suggest
that M ≈ 4D and f ≈ e−2.4M are appropriate selections to balance tracking
changes in operating point and steady-state error, and to prevent singularity
in the regressor matrix.
PMU Measurement Error Impacts. PMU measurement data may con-
tain errors due to a host of issues, e.g., communication channel failure, inad-
equate maintenance and calibration of PMUs, and detection of such errors
is an area of ongoing research [55]. The accuracy of measurement data used
in conventional applications, e.g., state estimation, is commonly assessed via
error residuals (see, e.g., [4]). Additionally, some erroneous data can be de-
tected by analyzing: (i) measurement magnitude, e.g., are the measurements
orders of magnitude too small or large to be plausible; and (ii) measurement
consistency, e.g., do the measurements result in gross violations of Kirch-
hoff’s laws. For the purposes of the work presented in this thesis, we assume
that standard checks have been performed on the PMU measurements prior
to their use in sensitivity estimation. Furthermore, the impacts of tempo-
rary errors in measured data are minimized through the use of weighted least
squares with a sliding measurement window and by setting f < 1.
3.4 Measurement-Based Loss Factor Applications
In this section, we give an overview of two key applications for measurement-
based LFs: (i) the market-based resource scheduling process known as the
real-time economic dispatch (ED); and (ii) the computation of real-time
LMPs.
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3.4.1 Real-Time Economic Dispatch
Recall that the real-time ED is a widely used operational tool that aims to
determine the change in the generator dispatch targets, ∆P g, required to
economically meet the forecast change in the load, ∆P d, and ensure system
physical constraints are met [53]. In this chapter, we assume the load has
an infinite willingness to pay and thus the objective of the real-time ED
reduces to the minimization of generator costs. We derived the real-time ED
in Section 2.5. However, for completeness, we restate it here:
min
∆P g
∑
i∈G
Ci(∆P
g
i + P
g
i,0) (3.22a)
s.t.
1TG∆P
g − 1TD∆P d −∆P ` = 0↔ λr (3.22b)
¯
P g ≤ P g0 + ∆P g ≤ P¯ g (3.22c)
¯
P f ≤ P f0 + Ψ∆P ≤ P¯ f ↔
¯
µf , µ¯f (3.22d)
where Ci(·) is the cost function of generator i, and ∆P ` = ΛT∆P g when using
the LF-based loss model commonly used in market applications. We note
that to focus on LF impacts on the ED, we leave out the security constraints
that would be present in a practical ED formulation—we will discuss in detail
such security constraints in Chapter 5. The primary outcome of the real-time
ED is the vector of generator dispatch instructions, ∆P g, which depend on
a system model via the LFs and ISFs in constraints (3.22b) and (3.22d)
respectively.
We deploy the measurement-based LFs from (3.20) to reformulate the
losses in (3.22b) as
∆Pˆ ` = ΛˆT∆P g, (3.23)
which no longer depends on a system model. The measurement-based esti-
mate of Λˆ is updated periodically via (3.19) and (3.20) as new measurements
arrive, and applied in the real-time ED constraint (3.22b). The elimination
of the real-time ED dependence on model-based ISFs in (5.9e) is the subject
of Chapter 5. Thus, for the sake of brevity, we defer its discussion here.
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3.4.2 Real-Time LMP Computation
As derived in Section 2.5, the so-called three-part LMP can be computed
from the ISFs, the LFs, and the shadow prices [50] as follows:
λ = 1Nλr + λ
c + λ`, (3.24)
where the congestion and losses components are, respectively, given by
λc = ΨT
(
µ¯f −
¯
µf
)
and λ` = λrΛ.
The congestion and loss components of the LMP depend on a system model
directly via Ψ and Λ. As such, errors in the system model may propagate to
the computation of the LMPs resulting in LMP errors. As above, we defer
to Chapter 5 for a discussion of removing the ISF-based model dependence
and the impacts of security constraints on the LMP. To address the LF-based
model dependence, we modify the LMP computation by replacing Λ in (3.24)
with its measurement-based estimate from (3.20), which is updated with new
measurements as needed, e.g., before a real-time ED execution.
3.5 Case Studies
In the following case studies, we compare the model-based, measurement-
based, and actual LFs and their resepective impacts when utilizing them to
determine the generator dispatch and LMPs via the real-time ED.
We deploy (3.7) to compute the conventional, model-based LFs. Further-
more, we calculate the actual LFs used in our studies by (i) increasing the
net injection at each bus by 0.01 p.u., and (ii) computing the change in losses
via a solution to the full nonlinear ac power flow with the appropriate sys-
tem model, and assuming the net injection change is balanced according to
distributed load slack weights, αd, defined ∀n ∈ N by
αdn =
∑
v∈Dn P
d
v,0∑
v∈D P
d
v,0
, (3.25)
where P dv,0 is the case nominal load injection for load v; to compute the actual
LFs, for each net injection increase and ac-power flow solution, we take the
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ratio of the ac-power-flow-calculated change in the losses and the change in
the net active power injection.
We compute the measurement-based LF estimates with (3.20) and (3.21),
and carry out the estimation procedures with simulated PMU measurements
(assumed to be collected at a measurement frequency of 30/s) of the random
fluctuations in each load injection v ∈ D, which are generated according to
P dv [k] = P
d
v,0[k] + σ1P
d
v,0[k]ν1 + σ2ν2, (3.26)
where P dv,0[k] is the case nominal load injection for load v at instant k, and ν1
and ν2 are pseudorandom values drawn from a normal distribution with zero
mean and standard deviations σ1, σ2 = 0.01, respectively (σ1P
d
v,0[k]ν1 repre-
sents random load fluctuations, whereas σ2ν2 represents measurement noise).
We compute simulated PMU measurements of generator injections P gi [k] for
each generator i ∈ G corresponding to the loads at instant k by solving (2.9)
with pre-allocation generation outputs P g[k − 1], and loads P d[k], nominal
bus reactive power injections Q0 and voltages V0 and distributed generator
slack weights, αg, defined ∀n ∈ N by
αgn =
∑
i∈Gn P¯
g
i∑
j∈G P¯
g
i
. (3.27)
For simplicity, we assume no variation in the load reactive power injections,
i.e., ∆Qdv[k] = 0, ∀v ∈ D. This assumption, however, does not impact the
nature of the results we present.
3.5.1 Case Studies I: The 6-Bus Test System
In this section, we present the results of case studies carried out on a modi-
fied version of the 3-generator, 6-bus test system provided in the simulation
package MATPOWER [56], the topology of which we show in Fig. 3.1; we
modified the test system by moving the generator at bus 3 to bus 6 and mov-
ing the load at bus 6 to bus 3. We assume each load has an infinite willingness
to pay, i.e., the demand is inelastic, and each generator, i, submits a quadratic
offer function of the form ai(P
g
i )
2 + biP
g
i + ci, the parameters of which are
provided in Table 3.1. Moreover, we select estimation parameter values of
M = 60 and f = 0.98 and simulate system operation for 300 measurement
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Figure 3.1: The 6-bus test system topology.
Table 3.1: The 6-bus test system generator cost function parameters.
generator ai [$/MWh
2] bi [$/MWh] ci [$]
1 0.1100 5.0 150
2 0.0850 1.2 600
6 0.1225 1.0 335
intervals using the approach to synthesizing PMU measurements outlined in
Section 3.5, and assume the nominal load at bus 3 increases linearly by 0.2
p.u. between intervals 100 and 200.
Impact on LFs of a Change in Operating Point. In this case, we
demonstrate the impact on the LFs of a change in the system operating point.
Do do so, we compare the pre-injection-change model-based LFs, computed
at interval 75, and the measurement-based LFs computed at intervals 75
(pre-operating-point change) and 225 (post-operating-point change) with the
actual LFs computed at the same intervals.
In Table 3.2, we show the actual LFs at the pre- and post-injection change
intervals—75 and 225, respectively—and the error between the actual and
the model- and measurement-based LFs, respectively. The LFs are sen-
sitive to changes in the operating point as illustrated by the change in
the actual LFs pre- and post-load increase. Prior to the operating point
change, the mean squared error (MSE) of the model-based LFs compared
to the actual LFs is 0.0055 MWh/MWh, whereas the post-change MSE is
0.0137 MWh/MWh, an increase of 97%. The measurement-based LFs com-
pared to the actual LFs, on the other hand, have pre- and post-injection
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Table 3.2: Pre- and post-load-change LFs.
LF error
actual LFs model-based measurement-based
bus
pre-
change
post-
change
pre-
change
post-
change
pre-
change
post-
change
1 0.0402 0.0481 -0.00179 -0.00973 0.0015 0.0020
2 0.0404 0.0426 -0.00258 -0.00473 0.0014 0.0014
3 0.0110 0.0047 -0.00243 0.00378 0.0004 0.0002
4 -0.0000 0.0045 0.00108 -0.00348 0.0003 -0.0000
5 -0.0093 -0.0078 -0.00155 -0.00303 0.0006 -0.0006
6 0.0333 0.0308 0.00329 0.00587 0.0013 0.0010
MSE: - - 0.0055 0.0137 0.0025 0.0028
[all values in MWh/MWh]
Table 3.3: Post-load-change LMPs.
actual model-based measurement-based
bus LMP LMP error LMP error
1 22.27 22.34 -0.072 22.26 0.011
2 22.40 22.40 -0.003 22.40 -0.003
3 23.28 22.95 0.335 23.32 -0.034
4 23.29 22.97 0.315 23.33 -0.039
5 23.57 23.23 0.347 23.63 -0.051
6 22.67 22.55 0.124 22.68 -0.013
MSE: - - 0.594 - 0.075
[all values in $/MWh]
change MSEs of 0.0025 MWh/MWh and 0.0028 MWh/MWh, respectively.
Thus, we conclude that the measurement-based LFs are a more accurate rep-
resentation of the maginal losses than the model-based LFs and are able to
track the changing operating point.
Impacts on Dispatch and LMPs of LF Errors. In this case, we demon-
strate the impacts on the real-time ED-determined dispatch instructions and
LMPs of model-based LF errors. We assume the real-time ED is executed
using (3.22) with each of the model-based, measurement-based and actual
LFs at interval 225—after the operating point change. Moreover, we assume
that the forecast bus load changes, ∆P dv , ∀v ∈ D, being balanced in the ED
are equal in magnitude to 5% of each bus’ load, i.e. ∆P dv = ξP
d
v,0 ∀v ∈ D,
where ξ = 0.05. We compute the LMPs with (3.24) for each of the real-time
ED solutions.
The deviations in the dispatch targets are negligible in this case due to
the size of the system, so we do not report them; however, as we will show
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in Section 3.5.2, in larger systems the dispatch impacts can be substan-
tial. In Table 3.3, we report the LMPs computed with the ED solutions
using the actual, model-based, and measurement-based LFs and model- and
measurement-based LF LMP errors with respect to the LMPs computed from
the solution to the ED with the actual LFs. The model-based LFs produce
LMPs with a total MSE of $0.594/MWh, while the measurement-based LFs
closely track the actual LMPs and have an MSE of $0.075/MWh—the LMP
errors resulting from the use of erroneous model-based LFs are non-trivial,
unlike those for the LMPs computed with the measurement-based LFs.
3.5.2 Case Studies II: IEEE 118-Bus Test System
In this section, we present the results of case studies carried out using the
IEEE 54-generator, 186-line, 118-bus test system [57]. As before, when solv-
ing the real-time ED, we assume each load has an infinite willingness to pay,
i.e., the demand is inelastic, and each generator, i, submits a quadratic offer
function of the form ai(P
g
i )
2 + biP
g
i + ci, the parameters of which we take
from the test case [57]. Moreover, in the LF estimations, we use the pa-
rameter values M = 236 and f = 0.99 and synthetic PMU measurements
of load demand and generator outputs generated using the procedure out-
lined in Section 3.5. To isolate the LF impacts on the ED in the following
cases, we have selected the line thermal limits such that there are no binding
transmission constraints.
Undetected Line Outage. In this case, we investigate the impacts on
LFs and real-time ED outcomes based on those LFs of an undetected line
outage. We simulate 1200 measurement intervals using simulated PMU mea-
surements of the load active power consumption and generator active power
production, synthesized as outlined in Section 3.5. Further, we assume there
is an undetected outage of the double circuit consisting of lines `141 and `142
at interval 600 and that the real-time ED in (3.22) is executed at interval
1100 assuming a forecast load increase of 5% at each load bus,.
In Fig. 3.2, we show the LF, dispatch target, and LMP absolute errors for:
(i) the measurement-based quantities with respect to the actual quantities;
(ii) the undetected outage model-based quantities with respect to the actual
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Figure 3.2: Absolute errors due to the undetected outage of double-circuit
`141, `142.
45
Table 3.4: LFs, dispatch target, and LMP MSE across all buses/generators
due to the undetected outage of `141, `142.
MSE
quantity
undet. outage
model-based
measurement-
based
LFs [MWh/MWh] 0.2374 0.0158
dispatch target [p.u.] 1.4189 0.0431
LMP [$/MWh] 13.1432 1.0340
quantities. The undetected line outage causes substantial model-based LF
errors, shown in Fig. 3.2a. These LFs errors are primarily driven by the
redistribution of line flows that takes place when the line outage occurs.
Thus, they are higher at those buses that are electrically close to the outaged
lines, e.g., buses 83–91, for which between 10 and 40% of the respective bus
injections flow over `141 and `142 prior to their outage.
The generator dispatch is also significantly impacted by the undetected
outage. The generator dispatch errors, shown in Fig. 3.2b, result in some
generator outputs, e.g., generators 38 and 40, changing by more than 0.7
p.u. between the model-based and measurement-based LF real-time ED
solutions. The generators for which the dispatch errors are the highest are
those at buses with high LF errors, i.e., those at buses close the outaged
facilities.
Finally, the LFs and dispatch errors contribute to LMP errors in the model-
based ED, shown in Fig. 3.2c, particularly at those buses electrically close
to the undetected outage. Our measurement-based approach, on the other
hand, incorporates the impacts of the undetected outage and produces LFs,
a generator dispatch, and LMPs that are very close to their actual values.
As evidenced by the LFs, dispatch, and LMP MSEs reported in Table 3.4,
the model-based LF performance suffers considerably when there are unde-
tected outages. The proposed measurement-based approach, on the other
hand, accurately captures the LFs regardless of changes in the system topol-
ogy resulting in MSEs that are an order of magnitude below those for the
model-based LFs.
Incorrect Model Line Impedance Data. In this case, we investigate
the impacts on the LFs and real-time ED outcomes based on those LFs
of incorrect line impedance data in the model. To this end, we perturb
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Figure 3.3: Absolute errors due to incorrect model line impedance data.
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Table 3.5: LFs, dispatch target, and LMP MSE across all buses/generators
due to incorrect line impedance data.
MSE
quantity
incorrect data
model-based
measurement-
based
LFs [MWh/MWh] 0.116 0.0078
dispatch target [p.u.] 0.911 0.0581
LMP [$/MWh] 4.52 0.337
the line impedance on each of the top 30% of loaded lines by a random
multiple in [0.7, 1.3] drawn from a uniform distribution. We simulate 600
PMU measurement intervals of load demand and generator output with the
correct model data using the approach to synthesizing PMU measurements
outlined above. We compute the model-based LFs using the incorrect model
data and the actual LFs using the correct model data. Further, we assume
the real-time ED in (3.22) is executed at interval 500 assuming a forecast
load increase of 5% at each load bus.
In Fig. 3.3, we show the LF, dispatch target, and LMP absolute errors for:
(i) the measurement-based quantities with respect to the actual quantities
computed with correct data; (ii) the incorrect data model-based quantities
with respect to the actual quantities computed with correct data. Incorrect
line impedance data for a subset of the lines impacts results in LF errors
at all buses, shown in Fig. 3.3a. Moreover, erroneous LFs cause substantial
errors in the generator dispatch, shown in Fig. 3.3b, and LMPs, shown in
Fig. 3.3c.
As shown in Table 3.5, the MSEs for the measurement-based LFs and
the dispatch targets and LMPs computed with those LFs are an order of
magnitude less than those for the respective model-based quantities. The
deployment of measurement-based LFs in the real-time ED offers substantial
enhancements compared to the model-based LFs, making the process robust
to model errors.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter, we developed a measurement-based approach for estimating
LFs. Our approach harnesses PMU measurements at the loads and genera-
tors to estimate the LFs without the use of a system model. Furthermore,
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our approach does not rely on arbitrarily selecting a set of distributed slack
weights.
As demonstrated in our case studies, our approach makes possible the com-
putation of LFs with high accuracy despite the challenges posed by changes
in the system operating point, undetected outages, and the existence of in-
correct data in the system model. The resulting measurement-based LFs
better reflect real-time system conditions and enhance the real-time ED and
LMP calculation.
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CHAPTER 4
GENERALIZED, SENSITIVITY-BASED
LINE OUTAGE ANGLE FACTORS
In this chapter, we propose a model-based approach to the computation of
line outage angle factors (LOAFs), which relies on the use of angle factors
(AFs) and injection shift factors (ISFs). A LOAF provides the ratio of the
difference between the outage angle and line angle, and the flow through
the line before the outage occurs. The proposed LOAFs, along with the
AFs and ISFs, enable a fast assessment of line outage angles, and, as we
show, provide system operators with a systematic mean for determining the
appropriate dispatch actions necessary to alleviate large outage angles. Ad-
ditionally, using the sensitivity estimation approach described in Chapter 3,
we formulate a PMU-measurement-based approach to computing LOAFs.
4.1 Introduction
System operators have long known that a transmission line breaker that has
tripped open can be safely reclosed only if the outage angle—the voltage
angle difference between the terminal buses of a transmission line after it
is outaged—is sufficiently small (see, e.g., [20]). Indeed, as mentioned in
Chapter 1, the failure to reclose a breaker due to a large line outage angle
was a contributing factor in the chain of events that ultimately resulted
in the 2011 San Diego blackout [3]. Furthermore, the blackout after-the-fact
assessment report concluded that “underlying factors that contributed to the
event... [included] not providing effective tools and operating instructions for
use when reclosing lines with large phase angle differences across the reclosing
breakers [3].” In this chapter, we introduce a sensitivity-based formulation of
the LOAFs and propose a set of LOAF-based tools that enable operators to:
(i) efficiently compute line outage angles; (ii) take effective action to reduce
outage angles. Such tools address the needs identified in [3] by providing
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effective means of preventing reliability issues that may result from a lack of
operator awareness of large outage angles.
A LOAF provides the ratio of the difference between the outage angle and
and line angle—the difference between the angle of the voltage at a line’s
terminal buses—and the flow through the line before the outage occurs. The
LOAF derivation and deployment relies on: (i) the AFs, which provide the
sensitivity of the bus voltage angles to changes in bus active power injections,
assuming the injection changes are balanced by a single slack bus or set of
slack buses; and (ii) the ISFs, which provide the sensitivity of line active
power flows to bus active power injections assuming they are balanced by a
single slack bus or set of slack buses. LOAFs, together with AFs and ISFs,
can be used to quickly compute line outage angles, and ascertain the impact
on line outage angles of line outages and active power injections.
Power system sensitivities, e.g., ISFs, are a critically important compo-
nent of real-time operational reliability processes, e.g., security-constrained
economic dispatch (SCED) (see, e.g., [25]). Conventional sensitivities and
tools such as the SCED, however, have not, up to now, effectively captured
outage angle impacts. Indeed, the need for angle-related reliability tools was
recently made explicit in [45]. The LOAFs were first proposed in [22]. How-
ever, the derivation of the LOAFs in [22] utilizes the dc assumptions1 and,
as such, the LOAFs remain fixed for all operating points under a specific
topology. Additionally, the derivation requires the computation of the bus
impedance matrix for each outage topology—a computationally burdensome
requirement for online applications.
In this chapter, we derive the LOAFs from a linearized power flow model—
without the dc assumptions—making use of the AFs and ISFs. Our approach
harnesses the concept of the flow-canceling transaction (FCT) used in the for-
mulation of another sensitivity-based quantity commonly utilized in contin-
gency analysis: the line outage distribution factors (LODFs) [42]. However,
in this thesis, we generalize the FCT concept by removing the need of the dc
assumptions in its derivation. Using our proposed approach, we are able to
compute the LOAF of any line from a single system topology—the outage-
free topology. Furthermore, we formulate a measurement-based LOAF using
1Recall that the dc assumptions are conventionally stated as follows: (i) the system is
lossless, (ii) the voltage at each bus is approximately equal to one p.u., (iii) the difference
in the voltage angles between each pair of connected buses is small [13].
51
the sensitivity estimation approach described in Chapter 3, which does not
require a (potentially erroneous) model of the system. Our proposed LOAFs
form the basis for effective and computationally efficient tools for use by
system operators in addressing the challenge of large line outage angle mon-
itoring and control.
4.2 Model-Based LOAF Computation
In this section, we describe our approach to the model-based LOAF com-
putation. We begin with a brief review of the model-based AFs and ISFs
derived in Sections 2.3 and 2.4, respectively. Then, we derive the generalized
FCT, which we use along with the AFs to derive the LOAFs.
4.2.1 Model-Based AF and ISF Computation
Model-Based AFs. As mentioned above, the AFs are the sensitivities
of the bus voltage angles with respect to the bus active power injections
assuming the change is balanced by a pre-specified slack bus, or distributed
slack bus. Let θn be the voltage angle at bus n, and let Pm be the net active
power injection at a bus m. Then, we define the AF for bus n with respect
to an injection at bus m that is withdrawn according to the distributed slack
policy as
Ω[n,m] =
∂θn
∂Pm
.
As developed in Section 2.3, the change in the bus voltage angles with
respect to active (reactive) power perturbations, ∆P ′ (∆Q′) is given by:
∆θ ≈ Ω∆P ′ + Ωq∆Q′, (4.1)
where
Ω = F + FαrT +Mc∗U, (4.2)
Ωq = M + FαwT +Mc∗W ), (4.3)
are active and reactive power AFs, respectively.
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Model-Based ISFs. As described previously, the ISFs are the sensitivities
of line active power flows to bus active power injections assuming the change
is balanced by a pre-specified slack bus, or distributed slack bus. In line with
the derivation in Section 2.4, define P fl,n = hl,n(x), where hl,n : R2N → RL, to
be the active power flow injected into line `l at the bus n end, which, without
loss of generality, we will assume is the from bus. Then, the ISF for the active
power injected at the from end of line `l ∈ L with respect to an active power
injection at bus n that is withdrawn according to the distributed slack policy
is defined as follows:
Ψ[l, n] =
∂P fl,n
∂Pn
.
Then, we can describe the variation in the active power flow ∆P fl,n in terms
of the variation in active and reactive power bus injections as follows:
∆P fl,n ≈ Ψl∆P ′ + Ψql∆Q′, (4.4)
where
Ψl = −sTl,n(J−1C + J−1CαrT +Bc∗U), (4.5)
Ψql = −sTl,n(J−1D + J−1DαwT +Bc∗W ), (4.6)
where sl,n =
∂hl,n
∂x
|x0 and Bc∗ is a matrix composed of the columns of J−1D
associated with voltage-controlled buses. In addition, recall that we denote
by Ψ the L × N ISF matrix, the rows of which are computed using (2.35).
Moreover, we define Ψr to be the matrix of sensitivities of the active power
flow at the to end of each line to bus injections, which is computed for
each line `l = (n,m) using hl,m(x) in a manner analogous to that used to
compute Ψ.
4.2.2 Model-Based LOAF Computation
The LOAF for line `l = (n,m) provides the ratio of the difference between
the outage angle and line angle of line `l to the flow on line `l before its
outage occurs. Let ∆θn-m = ∆θn −∆θm be the change in the voltage angle
across line `l in response to the outage of line `l, which has pre-outage flow,
P fl,n, at bus n, i.e., at the from end of the line. Then, define the LOAF for
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Figure 4.1: The flow-canceling transaction.
the outage of line `l as follows:
Σl =
∆θn-m
P fl,n
.
To derive LOAFs using the outage-free topology, we simulate the outage
of line `l = (n,m) by introducing active power injections ∆P
c
l,n and ∆P
c
l,m at
buses bus n and m, respectively, that result in zero net injection at each end
of line `l—a so-called flow-canceling transaction (FCT) [42]—as illustrated in
Fig. 4.1. However, in this thesis, we introduce the notion of the generalized
FCT, which does not, as is the case for the conventional notion of the FCT,
rely on the dc assumptions.
In order to enforce the desired zero net injection condition, we select the
magnitude of the generalized FCT injections such that
∆P cl,n = P
f
l,n + ∆P
f
l,n, (4.7)
and
∆P cl,m = P
f
l,m + ∆P
f
l,m, (4.8)
where ∆P fl,n and ∆P
f
l,m are the additional flow that appears at the respective
ends of line `l in response to injections ∆P
c
l,n and ∆P
c
l,m. For notational
simplicity in what follows, let P fl,n = P
f
l and ∆P
f
l,n = ∆P
f
l . Then, we relate
the flow at each end of line `l = (n,m) including the impacts of the FCT by
P fl,m + ∆P
f
l,m = P
f
l + ∆P
f
l − P `l −∆P `l , (4.9)
where P `l is the active power losses on line `l due to the original flow P
f
l
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Figure 4.2: Affine and linear loss approximation functions.
and ∆P `l is the change in losses due to the FCT. Moreover, we write ∆P
f
l in
terms of ISFs as follows:
∆P fl ≈ Ψ[l, n]∆P cl,n −Ψ[l,m]∆P cl,m, (4.10)
and we compute ∆P `l from the ISFs as follows:
∆P `l ≈ (Ψ[l, n]−Ψr[l, n])∆P cl,n − (Ψ[l,m]−Ψr[l,m])∆P cl,m. (4.11)
Next, we require a linear expression for P `l in terms of P
f
l for which the
approximated losses are: (i) zero when the line `l flow is zero, i.e., the rela-
tionship is strictly linear; and (ii) accurately represented around the nominal
operating point. To obtain such an expression, we assume that P `l ∝ (P fl )2.2
By linearizing this quadratic function about the operating point (P0, Q0, x0),
we can approximate the quadratic line `l losses as an affine function of the
line `l flows as
P `l ≈ P `l,0 + a(P fl − P fl,0), (4.12)
where a =
∂P `l
∂P fl
∣∣∣
x0
, and P fl,0 and P
`
l,0 are the nominal flow and line loss,
respectively, on line `l. Furthermore, considering a change in the flow on a
line `l as an equivalent injection at bus n, which we denote by ∆P˜n, we can
2The intuition behind this assumption, which we explore empirically in Appendix B,
is thus: ∆P fl ∝ ∆P and ∆P `l ∝ ∆P 2, hence P `l ∝ (P fl )2.
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approximate a using the ISFs as follows:
a ≈(Ψ[l, n]−Ψ
r[l, n])∆P˜n
Ψ[l, n]∆P˜n
=
(Ψ[l, n]−Ψr[l, n])
Ψ[l, n]
. (4.13)
Additionally, we use (4.13) to approximate the nominal line `l losses as
P `l,0 ≈ aP fl,0. (4.14)
Then, by substituting (4.13) and (4.14) into (4.12) and simplifying, we
obtain the following linear relationship between P `l and P
f
l :
P `l ≈ aP fl . (4.15)
Though the linear loss approximation in (4.15) meets criterion (i) above, this
approach is not ideal for the derivation of the LOAFs owing to the fact that,
as shown in Fig. 4.2, it grossly over-estimates the line losses at the nominal
operating point, i.e., criterion (ii) is not met. To obtain a more appropriate
linear representation of the line losses, we approximate the quadratic line
loss function by the following function:
P `l ≈
1
2
aP fl , (4.16)
which, as shown in Fig. 4.2, for a nominal flow and line loss on line `l, P
f
l,0 and
P `l,0, respectively, is exact for the point (P
f
l,0, P
`
l,0) and strictly linear. The line
loss representation in (4.16) is advantageous for deriving the LOAFs due to
the fact that it meets criteria (i) and (ii) above, and its being computed from
the ISFs, which are already computed periodically in the real-time operations
context. These advantages, however, come at the expense of decreased loss
approximation accuracy around the nominal operating point compared to
the affine approximation in (4.12).
Now, by substituting (4.9), (4.10), (4.11), and (4.16) into (4.7) and (4.8)
and rearranging, we obtain the desired FCT magnitudes at buses n and m
in terms of the pre-injection flow into `l at bus n as
∆P cl,n = XP
f
l , (4.17)
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and
∆P cl,m = Y P
f
l , (4.18)
where
X =
1−Ψ[l,m]Y
1−Ψ[l, n] ,
and
Y =
(Ψr[l, n] + Ψ[l, n](1−Ψ[l, n] + Ψr[l, n]))/(2Ψ[l, n])
1−Ψ[l, n] + Ψr[l, n]Ψ[l,m] + Ψr[l,m](1−Ψ[l, n]) ;
we note that X and Y depend only on the ISFs.
The application of the generalized FCT approximates the impact on the
system of the outage of line `l as a pair of net active power injections. Thus,
using superposition, one can easily see that in order to obtain the change in
the angle at any bus due to the FCT, we can use (4.2) considering the FCT
magnitudes, ∆P cl,n and ∆P
c
l,m, as an active power perturbation. In particular,
we can approximate the change in the angles at the line `l terminal buses n
and m, respectively, with respect to the outage of `l as
∆θn ≈ Ω[n, n]∆P cl,n − Ω[n,m]∆P cl,m, (4.19)
and
∆θm ≈ Ω[m,n]∆P cl,n − Ω[m,m]∆P cl,m. (4.20)
Now, by substituting (4.17) and (4.18) into (4.19) and (4.20), we obtain
expressions relating the line `l terminal bus voltage angles to its pre-outage
flow
∆θn ≈ (Ω[n, n]X − Ω[n,m]Y )P fl = TnP fl , (4.21)
and
∆θm ≈ (Ω[m,n]X − Ω[m,m]Y )P fl = −TmP fl . (4.22)
Next, by subtracting the angle change at each terminal node, given by (4.21)
and (4.22), we arrive at
∆θn-m = ∆θn −∆θm ≈ (Tn + Tm)P fl .
Thus, the LOAF for line `l is given by
Σl = Tn + Tm. (4.23)
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4.2.3 LOAFs under the Dc Assumptions
In applications for which the dc assumptions are appropriate, e.g., the day-
ahead markets, the computation of the LOAFs can be greatly simplified.
Consider again a line `l. With the assumption that the system is lossless, the
FCT magnitude for line `l is identical at both terminal buses and is given
by:
∆P cl = P
f
l + ∆P
f
l . (4.24)
Moreover, under the dc assumptions, we can write ∆P fl as
∆P fl = (Ψ[l, n]−Ψ[l,m])∆P cl . (4.25)
Substituting (4.25) into (4.24) and rearranging we arrive at the dc-model-
based FCT,
∆P cl =
P fl
1− (Ψ[l, n]−Ψ[l,m]) . (4.26)
Then, we can approximate the change in the angles at the line `l terminal
buses n and m, respectively, with respect to the outage of `l as follows:
∆θn ≈ (Ω[n, n]− Ω[n,m])∆P cl , (4.27)
and
∆θm ≈ (Ω[m,n]− Ω[m,m])∆P cl . (4.28)
Substituting (4.26) into (4.27) and (4.28), we obtain expressions relating the
line `l terminal bus voltage angles to its pre-outage flow
∆θn ≈ (Ω[n, n]− Ω[n,m])
1− (Ψ[l, n]−Ψ[l,m])P
f
k = T
dc
n P
f
l , (4.29)
and
∆θm ≈ (Ω[m,n]− Ω[m,m])
1− (Ψ[l, n]−Ψ[l,m])P
f
l = −T dcm P fl . (4.30)
Subtracting the angle change at each terminal node, given by (4.29) and
(4.30), we arrive at
∆θn-m = ∆θn −∆θm ≈ (T dcn + T dcm )P fl .
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Thus, the dc-model-based LOAF for line `l is given by
Σdcl = T
dc
n + T
dc
m . (4.31)
4.3 LOAF Applications
In this section, we give an overview of two primary online applications for
LOAFs, both of which are motivated by the needs expressed in the San Diego
blackout after-the-fact assessment report [3]: (i) line outage angle monitoring;
and (ii) generator dispatch considering outage angle limits across a set of lines
via LOAF-based reliability constraints in the SCED.
4.3.1 Outage Angle Monitoring
The LOAFs can be used to alert operators of the existence of large line
outage angles. To this end, the total outage angle between the terminal
buses of a line `l = (n,m), which we denote by θ
f
l , can be written in terms of
the bus angles and line flows (obtained from a state estimator or from PMU
measurements), and the LOAFs as follows:
θfl = θn-m + ΣlP
f
l , (4.32)
where θn-m = θn − θm.
The outage angles can also be computed with respect to the outage of
another line in the system by utilizing the line outage distribution factors
(LODFs), which, for any pair of lines, `l, `u, provide the proportion of the
pre-outage flow on a line `u that flows on a line `l in the event of the outage of
`u (see, e.g., [13]). Computing the impact of multiple outages on line outage
angles may be of interest for preventing cascading outages. Define θfl,u to be
the outage angle on line `l in the presence of the outage of line `u and let
Ξ[l, u] be the LODF for line `l with respect to the outage of line `u. Then,
we can compute θfl,u as follows:
θfl,u = θn-m + Σl(P
f
l + Ξ[l, u]P
f
u ). (4.33)
If an outage angle is shown via (4.32) or (4.33) to exceed a pre-specified limit,
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an alarm can be raised and the system operator can, if deemed necessary,
take actions to mitigate the angle using LOAF-based dispatch tools, one of
which we describe next.
4.3.2 SCED with Angle Constraints
The line outage angles computed online with (4.32) or (4.33) alert operators
of potential large outage angles. In order to systematically address identified
large outage angles, we propose extending the real-time SCED to include
angle constraints.
As stated previously, the real-time SCED is a widely used operational tool
that aims to determine the change in the generator dispatch targets, ∆P g,
required to economically meet the forecast change in the load, ∆P d, plus
losses, ∆P `, and ensure system physical constraints and reliability standards
are met [13]. Suppose the system is operating with a load and dispatch
(P d0 , P
g
0 ) and corresponding line flows P
f
0 . Moreover, assume that loads have
an infinite willingness to pay. Then, the real-time SCED problem, built on
the real-time ED formulated in (2.44), can be stated as follows [26]:
min
∆P g
∑
i∈G
Ci(∆P
g
i + P
g
i,0) (4.34a)
s.t.
1TG∆P
g − 1TD∆P d −∆P ` = 0↔ λr (4.34b)
¯
P g ≤ P g0 + ∆P g ≤ P¯ g (4.34c)
¯
P f ≤ P f0 + Ψ∆P ≤ P¯ f , ↔
¯
µ, µ¯ (4.34d)
¯
P s ≤ P f0 + Ψs∆P ≤ P¯ s, ↔
¯
µs, µ¯s (4.34e)
where Ci(·) is the cost function of generator i (typically a quadratic or
piecewise-linear function); Ψs is the matrix of post-outage ISFs for lines
at risk of overload due to an outage as determined from the results of con-
tingency analysis (see, e.g., [13]);
¯
P s (P¯ s) is the appropriately dimensioned
vector of security constraint lower (upper) limits; and
¯
µs (µ¯s) is the vector of
dual variables associated of the lower (upper) limiting security constraints.
The formulation of the conventional security constraints will be treated in
detail in Chapter 5. For now, it suffices to know that the aim of these con-
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straints is to prevent transmission equipment overloads.
The primary outcomes of the real-time SCED in (4.34) are generator dis-
patch instructions, ∆P g, that ensure N − 1 reliability, i.e., no piece of equip-
ment is overloaded by a single outage, and the locational marginal prices
(LMPs), which we discuss in Section 4.3.3. However, the conventional real-
time SCED does not guard against large line outage angles.
To bring outage angle considerations into the SCED, we formulate outage
angle-based reliability constraints for each line `l of interest using the AFs,
ISFs, and LOAFs as follows:
−θ¯fl ≤ θfl,0 + (Ωn − Ωm)∆P + ΣlΨl∆P ≤ θ¯fl ↔
¯
µθl , µ¯
θ
l , (4.35)
where Ωn (Ωm) is the nth (mth) row of Ω; θ
f
l,0 is the nominal line `l outage
angle, computed with (4.32); θ¯fl is the maximum allowable line `l outage
angle; and
¯
µθl (µ¯
θ
l ) are the angle constraint lower (upper) limit dual variables.
Those lines deemed to be critical, e.g., lines that must be reclosed quickly
in the event of a fault, can have their outage angle restricted in (4.34) by
including a constraint (4.35) for each such line.
4.3.3 LMP Angle Component
In current real-time market processes, and as defined in (2.45), the LMPs
are typically calculated from the ISFs, the LFs, and the shadow prices [50]
as follows:
λ˜ = λr1N +
[
Ψ
Ψs
]T ([
µ¯f
µ¯s
]
−
[
µf
µs
])
+ Λλr, (4.36)
where Λ is the N -dimensional marginal loss factor vector. Now, define
λc =
[
Ψ
Ψs
]T ([
µ¯f
µ¯s
]
−
[
µf
µs
])
, λ` = Λλr,
and λr = λr1N to be the N -dimensional vectors representing, respectively,
the congestion, loss, and energy components of the so-called three-part LMPs.
This conventional three-part LMP incorporates the price impacts of trans-
mission congestion due to network flows and reliability considerations. How-
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ever, it does not capture the potential for dispatch limitations due to angle
constraints.
To capture the impacts on the LMPs of the introduction of angle reliability
constraints in (4.35) we must include an additional LMP component in (4.36).
Define λθ to be the N -dimensional vector of angle components of the LMP
and Ψθ to be the matrix of angle constraint coefficients, a row of which,
corresponding to an angle constraint on a line `l = (n,m), is given by
Ψθl = (Ωn − Ωm) + ΣlΨl.
Next, using Ψθ and the shadow prices of the angle constraints, we compute
the angle components of the LMP as follows:
λθ = (Ψθ)T
(
µ¯θ −
¯
µθ
)
. (4.37)
Then, the total LMP, including the angle component, is given by
λ = λr + λc + λ` + λθ. (4.38)
The angle components of the LMP capture the cost to deliver the next MW
to each bus associated with angle-constraint-driven dispatch limitations.
4.4 Case Studies
In this section, we report the results of case studies carried out on the IEEE
14- and 118-bus test systems to demonstrate the accuracy with which the
LOAFs can predict the outage angles, as well as the application of the LOAFs
in the SCED.
4.4.1 Case Studies I: The 14-Bus Test System
Here, we present the results of a case study carried out using a modified ver-
sion of the IEEE 5-generator, 20-line, 14-bus test system [56], the topology of
which is shown in Fig. 4.3. The test system has been modified by condensing
the parallel lines between buses 1 and 2 into a single, equivalent line.
We first illustrate the accuracy of using the LOAFs to predict outage
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Figure 4.3: The IEEE 14-bus test system.
angles. To do so, we compute the LOAF-predicted outage angles, using
(4.32) with LOAFs computed with (4.23) using AFs and ISFs computed
with (2.29) and (2.36), respectively, at an ac-OPF solution, which is solved
at the nominal load provided with the test case, and nominal voltage angles
from the same solution. Then, we compare the LOAF-predicted outage angle
to the actual outage angles, which are computed by repeatedly solving the
ac power flow around the same ac-OPF solution used to compute the outage
angle predictions with a single line removed in each solution and comparing
the angles in the outage cases to those in the non-outage case.
As shown in Fig. 4.4a, the outage angles predicted by the LOAFs match
well with the actual outage angles; the absolute outage angle error, shown
in Fig. 4.4b, is less than 0.5 degrees for the most of the highly impacted
lines, with the exception of line `2, which has an outage angle of 35 degrees
and 2 degrees of LOAF-predicted outage angle error. However, as shown in
Fig. 4.4c, the percent error of the outage angles at all of the highly impacted
lines is less than 6%. Suppose the system operator aimed to keep the outage
angles of all lines under a pre-defined threshold, e.g., 30 degrees. Then,
LOAF-enabled outage angle monitoring could, in this case, raise an alarm
for line `2 outage angle so that the operator could, if deemed necessary, take
action to reduce the outage angle, e.g., by redispatching generation.
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Figure 4.4: Model-based LOAF-predicted vs. actual outage angles and
errors for lines with outage angle changes ≥ 5 degrees.
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Table 4.1: The 118-bus test system modified line limits.
line: `8 `31 `71 `98 `99 `138 `139
P¯ fl (MW): 200 60 50 70 70 70 70
4.4.2 Case Studies II: The 118-Bus Test System
Here, we present the results of case studies carried out using a modified IEEE
54-generator, 186-line, 118-bus test system [56], in which a subset of line
limits, shown in Table 4.1, have been reduced so as to introduce transmission
congestion; the lower limits on each line in this subset are selected such that
¯
P fl = −P¯ fl . The case studies demonstrate the application of the LOAFs
to formulated an angle-constrained SCED. To focus on the impacts of the
angle constraints, we assume that there are no potential overloads identified
through contingency analysis and thus no conventional security constraints in
the SCED. Furthermore, we assume that each load has an infinite willingness
to pay, i.e., the demand is inelastic, and each generator i ∈ G submits a
quadratic offer function of the form ai(P
g
i )
2 + biP
g
i + ci in the SCED, the
parameters of which are taken from the test case.
We demonstrate the execution of the SCED with angle constraints to con-
trol the absolute outage angles to within a pre-specified limit and the accu-
racy of the LOAF-predicted outage angles on a larger-scale system. To do so,
we solve two cases of the SCED in (4.34), each computed around an ac-OPF
solution computed at the nominal load provided with the test case: (i) SCED
with no angle constraints, i.e., the conventional SCED; and (ii) SCED with
the angle constraints defined by (4.35) included for each line and a maximum
outage angle of 20 degrees, i.e., the angle-constrained SCED. For both the
conventional and angle-constrained SCED solutions, we compute the LMPs
using (4.36) and (4.38), respectively. Additionally, to demonstrate the ac-
curacy of the LOAFs, we compute the LOAF-predicted and actual outage
angles at the conventional SCED solution. As before, the actual outage an-
gles are computed by solving an ac power flow at the SCED solution for the
outage of each line individually.
Table 4.2 shows the error statistics for the absolute and percent absolute
angle errors between the actual and LOAF-predicted outage angles computed
at the conventional SCED solution. As in the 14-bus case described in Sec-
tion 4.4.1, LOAFs in this case prove to be an accurate predictor of the outage
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Table 4.2: LOAF-predicted vs. actual outage angle error statistics at
conventional SCED solution in the 118-bus case.
statistic
absolute outage angle
error [deg.]
percent absolute outage
angle error [%]
MSE: 1.66 6.75
min: 0.02 0.07
mean: 0.29 1.30
max: 1.09 4.13
angles. Indeed, the maximum absolute outage angle error is 1.09 degrees and
the mean-squared error (MSE) over all outage angles is 1.66 degrees, while
those of the percent absolute error are 4.12% and 6.75%, respectively.
As shown in Fig. 4.5a, the outage angles on lines `10 and `37 exceed the 20
degree limit at the conventional SCED solution. However, when the angle
constraints from (4.35) are include, the outage angles remain within the spec-
ified 20 degree limit. The outage angles are maintained within their limits
by modifying the generator dispatch, shown in Fig. 4.5b for the conventional
and angle-constrained SCED. The redispatch required to bring the outage
angles on lines `10 and `37 within the limits is substantial. For example,
generator 5, which resides at bus 10, has its dispatch reduced by more than
1 p.u. in the angle-constrained SCED solution due to its electrical proximity
to bus 8, a terminal bus of line `37—in fact, nearly 75% of the active power
injected at bus 10 flows over line `37.
Furthermore, the angle-constrained LMPs, shown in Fig. 4.5c, and the an-
gle component of those LMPs, computed with (4.37) and shown in Fig. 4.6,
provide an indication of the buses at which active power injections into the
system cause increases in the outage angles that are at their limit. Those
buses at which the angle component of the LMP is negative, i.e., the LMP
decreases in the angle-constrained SCED solution compared to the conven-
tional SCED, e.g., buses 10 and 89, are buses at which active power injections
increase the outage angle on binding lines, e.g., line `37, which, in this case,
correspond to the buses at which the generators with the largest decrease in
dispatch reside (generators 5 and 40). Conversely, those buses at which the
angle component of the LMP is positive, i.e., the LMP increases with angle
constraints, e.g., buses 4, 6, and 32, are buses at which active power injections
reduce the outage angle on binding lines, which, in this case, correspond to
the buses at which the generators with the largest increase in dispatch reside
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Figure 4.5: Outage angles for lines with outage angle changes greater than
10 degrees, LMPs, and generator dispatch targets obtained with the
conventional SCED and the SCED with angle constraints.
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Figure 4.6: Angle component of the LMP for SCED with angle constraints.
(generators 2, 3, and 15).
Thus, the angle-constrained SCED could provide system operators the ca-
pability to systematically dispatch generation so as to restrict outage angles
to within pre-specified bounds, e.g., those defined by recloser settings or syn-
chrocheck relays. Moreover, the angle component of the LMP gives economic
signals that provide a high-level view of the impacts of redispatch decisions
on the angles and those buses at which injections may adversely/beneficially
impact outage angles that are near their limit.
4.5 Extension: Measurement-Based LOAF
Computation
We note that the LOAF defined in (4.23) is computed using ISFs and AFs.
As such, it is straightforward to apply the sensitivity estimation approach
proposed in Chapter 3 for estimating LFs and that to be presented in Chap-
ter 5 for estimating ISFs to compute a measurement-based LOAF. To do so,
we require the additional step of computing a measurement-based estimate
of the AFs.
Consider the same power system defined in Section 2.2. Suppose the net
active (reactive) power injected into the system at bus n at time t, Pn(t)
(Qn(t)), varies by a small amount ∆Pn(t) (∆Qn(t)) from time t to time
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t + ∆t, where ∆t > 0 and small. Further, let ∆θpm,n(t) (∆θ
q
m,n(t)) be the
change in angle of the voltage at bus m due to ∆Pn (∆Qn). Then, define
the AF for a bus m with respect to an active power injection at bus n as
Ω[m,n] =
∂θm
∂Pn
≈ ∆θ
p
m,n
∆Pn
, (4.39)
and the AF for bus m with respect to a reactive power injection at bus n as
Ωq[m,n] =
∂θm
∂Qn
≈ ∆θ
q
m,n
∆Qn
. (4.40)
While ∆θpm,n(t) and ∆θ
q
m,n(t) are not directly available through PMU mea-
surements, we can, however, measure ∆θm(t), the total change in bus m
voltage angle due to bus injections at time t. We observe that the variation
in the angle of the voltage at bus m is due to variations in the active and
reactive power injections at each bus n:
∆θm = ∆θ
p
m,1(t) + · · ·+ ∆θpm,N(t) + ∆θqm,1(t) + · · ·+ ∆θqm,N(t). (4.41)
Employing (4.39) and (4.40) in (4.41) we obtain
∆θm ≈∆P1(t)Ω[m, 1] + · · ·+ ∆PN(t)Ω[m,N ]
+∆Q1(t)Ω
q[m, 1] + · · ·+ ∆QN(t)Ωq[m,N ].
Now suppose we have M + 1 sets of synchronized measurements. Let
∆Pn[k] = Pn[(k + 1)∆t]− Pn[k∆t],
∆Qn[k] = Qn[(k + 1)∆t]−Qn[k∆t],
∆θm[k] = θm[(k + 1)∆t]− θm[k∆t],
for n = 1, . . . ,M and define
∆Pn = [∆Pn[1] · · · ∆Pn[k] · · · ∆Pn[M ]]T ,
∆Qn = [∆Qn[1] · · · ∆Qn[k] · · · ∆Qn[M ]]T ,
∆θm = [∆θm[1] · · · ∆θm[k] · · · ∆θm[M ]]T .
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Furthermore, let
Ωm = [Ω[m, 1], . . . ,Ω[m,n], . . . ,Ω[m,N ]],
Ωqm = [Ω
q[m, 1], . . . ,Ωq[m,n], . . . ,Ωq[m,N ]],
Ωsl = [(Ωm)
T (Ωqm)
T ]T .
Then, clearly,
∆θm = [∆P1 · · · ∆Pn · · · ∆PN · · · ∆Q1 · · · ∆Qn · · · ∆QN ] (Ωsm)T .
(4.42)
Now, let ∆P = [∆P1 · · · ∆Pn · · · ∆PN ], ∆Q = [∆Q1 · · · ∆Qn · · · ∆QN ],
and ∆S = [∆P T ∆QT ]T . Then, the system in (4.42) becomes
∆θm = ∆S(Ω
s
l )
T . (4.43)
If M ≥ 2N , then (4.43) is an overdetermined system. Moreover, assuming
the AFs are approximately constant over the M + 1 measurements,3 we can
obtain an estimate of Ωm from least-squares error estimation as
(Ωˆsm)
T = (∆ST∆S)−1∆ST∆Sfl , (4.44)
the first N elements of which are the desired measurement-based active power
AFs, Ωˆm, for bus m. Let Ωˆ be the N ×N matrix of measurement-based AF
estimates. Then, a measurement-based estimate of the LOAF can be com-
puted using (4.23) with the measurement-based AFs estimated with (4.44)
and measurement-based ISFs, which we will derive in Chapter 5.
4.6 Summary
In this chapter, we introduced a formulation of the generalized LOAFs based
on the AFs and ISFs computed without the dc assumptions. The proposed
LOAFs, together with the AFs and ISFs, provide a means of assessing the
impacts of line outage angles using only the non-outage system topology.
Additionally, we propose an approach for computing LOAFs from AFs and
3We provide an empirical analysis of this assumption in Appendix B.
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ISFs estimated from PMU measurements without the need of a system model.
Furthermore, we formulate LOAF-based angle monitoring and dispatch
tools, the need of which was identified as critically important by the 2011 San
Diego blackout after-the-fact assessment report. As demonstrated above, the
angle monitoring, angle-constrained SCED, and angle component of the LMP
proposed in this thesis provides a systematic means of controlling outage
angles and assessing the costs of maintaining outage angle reliability.
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CHAPTER 5
MEASUREMENT-BASED REAL-TIME
SECURITY-CONSTRAINED ECONOMIC
DISPATCH
In this chapter, we propose a measurement-based approach to the real-time
security-constrained economic dispatch (SCED). The real-time SCED is a
widely used market scheduling tool that seeks to economically balance elec-
tricity system supply and demand and provide locational marginal prices
(LMPs). To capture network flows and security considerations, the conven-
tional SCED relies on sensitivities that are typically computed from a model
of the system obtained oﬄine. Our approach utilizes power system sensitiv-
ities estimated from phasor measurement unit (PMU) measurements.
5.1 Introduction
As described in Chapter 1, independent system operators (ISOs)/regional
transmission organizations (RTOs) oversee scheduling procedures consist-
ing of a sequence of forward markets based on security-constrained unit
commitment- and economic dispatch-based algorithms (see, e.g., [24], [25]).
The goal of these processes is to schedule resources on various time-scales such
that the system operator can maintain the supply-demand balance around-
the-clock, and satisfy operational and physical constraints imposed by the
electricity network and reliability standards. Moreover, the market outcomes
include resource dispatch targets and the prices for energy, the locational
marginal prices (LMPs), and ancillary services [26], which provide important
economic signals to participants. The so-called real-time markets are the final
stage in the market scheduling process, and real-time security-constrained
economic dispatch (SCED), which relies on accurate contingency selection
and analysis, is a key component of that stage. Typically, the real-time
SCED is formulated using model-based loss sensitivities—the marginal loss
factors (LFs)—to represent system-wide losses, and linear flow sensitivities—
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the injection shift factors (ISFs)—to represent active power flows [13].
In order to perform conventional contingency analysis and formulate the
real-time SCED, the system operator requires an up-to-date model of the
ISO/RTO’s electricity system and that of neighboring systems, which is typ-
ically derived from the output of a state estimator. As described in Chapter 1,
the state estimator-based model is vulnerable to errors due to numerous phe-
nomena, modeling assumptions, and changing ambient operating conditions.
Thus, the accuracy of security constraints identified through contingency
analysis and the dispatch targets and LMPs determined in the model-based
real-time SCED are coupled with the accuracy of the system model and,
as such, subject to the same vulnerabilities. Inaccurate contingency anal-
ysis, dispatch targets, and LMPs have economic implications, e.g., sending
incorrect local price signals and over/under payment to resources, as well
as system reliability implications, e.g., unintended equipment overloads and
outages [2, 3, 41].
In this chapter, we propose a measurement-based approach to the real-
time SCED. Our aim is to overcome the above-described shortcomings of the
model-based SCED. To do so, we reformulate the SCED constraints using
more accurate data by removing model-based quantities and replacing them
with measurement-based estimates of the same quantities. Specifically, we
reformulate three types of constraints: (i) the power balance constraint; (ii)
network flow constraints; and (iii) security constraints. In the model-based
SCED, (i) depends on model-based LFs, whereas (ii) and (iii) depend on
model-based ISFs and sensitivities derived from ISFs. Instead of relying on
model-based LFs and ISFs, our approach utilizes measurement-based LFs
and ISFs computed using the LF estimation approach described in Chapter
3, and a measurement-based method for estimating ISFs similar to that de-
scribed in [18] and [43]. By removing the model-dependence of the SCED,
our approach virtually eliminates the impacts of phenomena such as unde-
tected changes in system topology and erroneous model parameters on the
real-time SCED outcomes
Our approach relies on the availability of phasor measurement units (PMUs),
the preponderance of which in power systems is facilitating the proliferation
of a new generation of operational tools that harness the very high frequency
and time synchronicity of their measurements (see, e.g., [7], [58],). Indeed,
thousands of PMUs have been installed in North America over the past
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decade and many relays come equipped with PMU functionality (see, e.g.,
[8]). The use of PMU data in real-time operations has been promoted as
a means by which to circumvent the shortcomings of the existing telemetry
system, and reduce the frequency of occurrence and the magnitude of the
impact of preventable outages [3]. As we show, the real-time contingency
selection and SCED processes can likewise be enhanced by the deployment
of PMU measurements.
5.2 Conventional Real-Time SCED
The SCED is a reliability-enhancing market scheduling tool that is built on
the real-time ED formulation presented in Section 2.5. The SCED has four
primary components: (i) power flow and network flow constraints obtained
from a model of the system; (ii) equipment constraints, e.g., generator power
output limits; (iii) the objective, typically the maximization of social surplus
or minimization of generator costs, commonly quadratic or piecewise-linear
functions; and (iv) reliability-driven constraints, e.g., reserve requirement
and security constraints; (see, e.g., [13], [27], [53]). Components (i)-(iii) are
precisely the real-time ED, while component (iv) is introduced so as to bring
operational reliability considerations into the real-time market scheduling
process.
The conventional SCED formulation used in the market setting depends
heavily on the ISFs via the network flow and security constraints. Thus, the
remainder of this section is dedicated to the discussion of the ISFs in the
context of those constraints and their incorporation into the SCED.
5.2.1 Network Flow Constraints
As described in Section 2.5, the ISF matrix, denoted by Ψ, provides the basis
of the ISF-based dc-OPF network flow representation. Recall that an entry
of Ψ, denoted by Ψ[l, n], provides the sensitivity of the flow on line `l ∈ L
to an injection at bus n that is withdrawn at the slack bus. Under the dc
assumptions, Ψ can be calculated directly from the network connectivity and
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parameters using (2.38).1
Using the model-based ISFs from (2.38), we may define the vector of in-
cremental line flows in terms of the incremental bus injections as
∆P f = Ψ∆P, (5.1)
which are bounded above and below by the line upper and lower incremental
limits, denoted by ∆P¯ f = P¯ f − P f0 and ∆¯P
f =
¯
P f − P f0 , respectively.
5.2.2 Security Constraints
Power systems are typically operated with the so-called “N-1” security cri-
terion, i.e., no equipment will be overloaded by the outage of a single line,
generator, or other facility. To ensure that this requirement is upheld in the
solution of the real-time SCED, so-called security constraints are added to
the formulation. These constraints incorporate the post-contingency behav-
ior of the system into the real-time SCED so that the resulting dispatch is
secure under such contingencies. In this thesis, we consider a deterministic
formulation of the SCED with no corrective actions, i.e., no decision variables
for post-contingency reconfiguration of system resources. Such a formulation
is a preventative approach to ensuring system security, and is consistent with
current practice in ISO/RTO-run markets [28]. Alternative SCED formu-
lations, which include the possibility of post-contingency reconfiguration of
system resources in response to contingencies, have been proposed (see, e.g.,
[30], [32], [59]), but, to our knowledge, their deployment in practical real-time
operations has so far been limited in scope.
In order to select the contingencies for which security constraints will be
formulated, the system operator undertakes contingency selection and con-
tingency analysis so as to ascertain the contingencies, e.g., line and generator
outages, that will result in overloads on system equipment should they occur.
In practice, operators do not consider the impacts of every possible single out-
1As we showed in Section 2.4, the ISFs can also be computed by linearizing the system
model around a known ac power flow solution, typically obtained from the state estimator.
Thus, if the model of the system is correct, ac-based sensitivities computed in this way
are more accurate than the sensitivities computed under the dc assumptions (i.e., those in
(2.38)); however, ac-based sensitivities obtained in this fashion might also be inaccurate
if the model of the system used to computed them contains errors.
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age on every piece of equipment, e.g., line, transformer, in the system, rather
they consider a subset of facilities and contingencies via a pre-defined set
of so-called mon-con pairs—each mon-con pair specifies a monitored facility
and the contingency with respect to which it is monitored for overloads.
To be useful in the real-time operational context, real-time contingency
analysis (RTCA) must be executed in a timely fashion (on the order of min-
utes, see, e.g. [60]). As such, RTCA is typically conducted using a con-
tingency list composed of a subset of all possible mon-con pairs, which are
selected using a combination of off-line studies, operator discretion, and dc-
analysis, e.g., the flow performance index [13]. Ac power flow-based RTCA
is used to analyze each mon-con pair on the contingency list, i.e., those mon-
con pairs deemed to have significant potential to degrade system security.
The outcome of RTCA is a set of mon-con pairs for which the corresponding
outages cause overloads and for which security constraints must be included
in the SCED.
Sensitivity-based quantities, namely the power transfer distribution factors
(PTDFs) and line outage distribution factors (LODFs), which we defined
in Section 2.4, are essential to the formulation of security constraints [13].
Recall that the N × N matrix of PTDFs for a line `l, which we denote by
Φl, provides the sensitivity of the flow on line `l to real-power transactions
between buses in the system. Additionally, recall that the L × L matrix of
LODFs, which we denote by Ξ, provides the proportion of the pre-outage
flow on each line `l that flows on each in-service line `u in the system in the
event of the outage of line `l
Let Cg and Cf be the sets of generator and line outage mon-con pairs,
respectively, identified by the system operator through contingency analysis
as causing overloads. The sets Cg and Cf consist of doubles of the form
(`u, c
g
j ) and (`u, c
f
l ), respectively, where (`u, c
g
j ) is the mon-con pair for the
overload of monitored line `u with respect to the outage of generator j, and
(`u, c
f
l ) is the mon-con pair for the overload of monitored line `u with respect
to the outage of line `l.
We formulate an incremental security constraint for each line outage mon-
con pair, (`u, c
f
l ) ∈ Cf , using the LODFs from (2.40) as follows
∆
¯
P f
u,cfl
≤ Ψu∆P + Ξ[u, l]Ψl∆P ≤ ∆P¯ f
u,cfl
, (5.2)
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where
∆
¯
P f
u,cfl
=
¯
P fu − P fu,0 − Ξ[u, l]P fl,0,
∆P¯ f
u,cfl
= P¯ fu − P fu,0 − Ξ[u, l]P fl,0,
Ψu (Ψl) is the uth (lth) row of the ISF matrix, and P
f
u,0 (P
f
l,0) is the nominal
active power flow on line `u (`l). Then, define Ψ
f as the matrix of line flow to
bus injection sensitivities for all line outages, where each row m corresponds
to a mon-con pair (`u, c
f
l ) ∈ Cf and is given by
Ψfm = Ψu + Ξ[u, l]Ψl. (5.3)
The line flow impacts of generator contingencies depends on the response
of the remaining generators in the system to such a continency, which is
typically approximated by a function of each generator’s inertial constant,
maximum capacity, or dispatchable range [13]. For the contingency of a
generator j, we assume the generators remaining online respond according
to pre-specified participation factors corresponding to the outage of generator
j. Define the participation factor of each generator i corresponding to the
outage of generator j by
αgi (c
g
j ) =

P¯ gi∑
i∈G,i 6=j P¯
g
i
if i 6= j, i ∈ G,
−1 if i = j, i ∈ G,
0 otherwise.
(5.4)
Then, let α(cgj ) be the N -dimensional vector of nodal generator participation
factors corresponding to the outage of generator j, each entry of which is
given by
αn(c
g
j ) =
∑
i∈Gn
αgi (c
g
j ). (5.5)
For notational convenience, and without loss of generality, we assume there
are no loads at the generator buses. Then, using the participation factors
from (5.5), we formulate an incremental security constraint for each generator
outage mon-con pair, (`u, c
g
j ) ∈ Cg, as follows
∆
¯
P f
u,cgj
≤ Ψu∆P + (Ψuα(cgj )eTj )∆P ≤ ∆P¯ fu,cgj , (5.6)
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where
∆
¯
P f
u,cgj
=
¯
P fu − P fu,0 − (Ψuα(cgj )eTj )P0,
∆P¯ f
u,cgj
= P¯ fu − P fu,0 − (Ψuα(cgj )eTj )P0,
and ej is an N -dimensional vector with a one in the jth entry and a zero
in each other entry. Define Ψg as the matrix of line flow to bus injection
sensitivities for the generator outages, where each row m corresponds to a
mon-con pair (`u, c
g
j ) ∈ Cg and is given by
Ψgm = Ψu + (Ψuα(c
g
j ))e
T
j . (5.7)
Furthermore, to ensure reliability is not compromised by a generator out-
age, there must be adequate upward capacity among all generators in the
system to respond to the outage. Such limitations are typically captured
in the SCED through the provision of reserves—also referred to as ancil-
lary services—via the inclusion of reserve requirement constraints. Though
critically important for maintaining reliability, the reserve requirement con-
straints are not directly impacted by the measurement-based formulation
proposed here and so, for the sake of brevity, we do not explicitly represent
them in the formulation.
Let ∆
¯
P s, ∆P¯ s, be the vectors of lower and upper security constraint incre-
mental limits, respectively, which consist of the incremental line limits cor-
responding to the potentially overloaded lines of their respective incremental
security constraints from (5.2) and (5.6). Then, we can concisely state the
collection of incremental security constraints corresponding to those mon-con
pairs in Cf and Cg and defined in (5.2) and (5.6), respectively, as
∆
¯
P s ≤ Ψs∆P ≤ ∆P¯ s, (5.8)
where
Ψs =
[
Ψf
Ψg
]
.
5.2.3 Model-Based Real-Time SCED Problem Formulation
Combining the ED formulation in (2.44) with the constraints that result from
the network flow expression in (5.1) and the security constraints in (5.8), we
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formulate the model-based real-time SCED as follows:
max
∆P g ,∆P d
S (∆P g,∆P d) (5.9a)
s.t.
1G∆P
g − 1D∆P d −∆P ` = 0 ↔ λr (5.9b)
¯
P g ≤ P g0 + ∆P g ≤ P¯ g (5.9c)
¯
P d ≤ P d0 + ∆P d ≤ P¯ d (5.9d)
∆
¯
P f ≤ Ψ∆P ≤ ∆P¯ f ↔
¯
µf , µ¯f (5.9e)
∆
¯
P s ≤ Ψs∆P ≤ ∆P¯ s ↔
¯
µs, µ¯s, (5.9f)
where
¯
µs, µ¯s are the dual variables of the security constraints. Note that
for clarity of presentation in (5.9), we have left out of the real-time SCED
the ramping constraints that are often present in a practical real-time SCED
[26]. Ramping constraints are the same regardless of the use of model- or
measurement-based sensitivities. Thus, the exclusion of such constraints has
no bearing on the formulation of the measurement-based real-time SCED and
they may easily be included in our approach. Additionally, such an exclusion
does not change the nature of the comparisons we present in the case studies,
rather the inclusion of ramping constraints would serve to increase the LMPs
in all cases.
The primary outcomes of the real-time SCED are: (i) the optimal generator
and load dispatch instructions, which are a direct result of the solution to
(5.9); and (ii) the LMPs, which are not a direct result of the solution to
(5.9), but may be calculated from the ISFs, the LFs, and the shadow prices
[50, 61], along the same lines used in (2.45), as follows:
λ = λr1N +
[
Ψ
Ψs
]T ([
µ¯f
µ¯s
]
−
[
¯
µf
¯
µs
])
+ λrΛ, (5.10)
where 1N is an N -dimensional all-ones vector. Now, define
λc =
[
Ψ
Ψs
]T ([
µ¯f
µ¯s
]
−
[
¯
µf
¯
µs
])
and λ` = λrΛ,
to be the N -dimensional vectors representing the congestion and loss com-
ponents of the LMPs. The SCED LMPs in (5.10) differ from the ED LMPs
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derived in (2.45) owing to the fact that they incorporate the dual variables
of the security constraints into the congestion component.
5.3 Measurement-Based Real-Time SCED
It is clear from (5.9) and (5.10) that the dispatch targets and LMPs calcu-
lated from the results of the model-based real-time SCED depend heavily
on the model-based LFs and ISFs and how accurately these LFs and ISFs
reflect the conditions in the system at the time the real-time SCED is formu-
lated. However, due to potential inaccuracies in telemetry and state estima-
tion that may propagate to the underlying system model, these model-based
sensitivities may not always reflect the real-time system conditions. We ad-
dress this shortcoming of the model-based SCED via the deployment of the
measurement-based LF estimation approach described in Chapter 3, and a
measurement-based ISF estimation approach similar to that proposed in [18].
5.3.1 Measurement-Based ISFs
Consider the same power system defined in Section 2.2. Suppose the net
active (reactive) power injected into the system at bus n at time t, Pn(t)
(Qn(t)), varies by a small amount ∆Pn(t) (∆Qn(t)) from time t to time
t + ∆t, where ∆t > 0 and small. Further, let ∆P f,pl,n (t) (∆P
f,q
l,n (t)) be the
change in active power flow on line `l due to ∆Pn (∆Qn). Define the ISF for
line `l with respect to an active power injection at bus n as
Ψ[l, n] =
∂P fl
∂Pn
≈ ∆P
f,p
l,n
∆Pn
, (5.11)
and the ISF for line `l with respect to a reactive power injection at bus n as
Ψq[l, n] =
∂P fl
∂Qn
≈ ∆P
f,q
l,n
∆Qn
. (5.12)
While ∆P f,pl,n (t) and ∆P
f,q
l,n (t) are not directly available through PMU mea-
surements, we can, however, measure ∆P fl (t), the total change in active
power flow on line `l due to bus injections at time t. We observe that the
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variation in the flow on line `l is due to variations in the active and reactive
power injections at each bus n:
∆P fl = ∆P
f,p
l,1 (t) + · · ·+ ∆P f,pl,N (t) + ∆P f,ql,1 (t) + · · ·+ ∆P f,ql,N(t). (5.13)
Employing (5.11) and (5.12) in (5.13) we obtain
∆P fl ≈∆P1(t)Ψ[l, 1] + · · ·+ ∆PN(t)Ψ[l, N ]
+∆Q1(t)Ψ
q[l, 1] + · · ·+ ∆QN(t)Ψq[l, N ].
Now suppose we have M + 1 sets of synchronized measurements. Let
∆Pn[k] = Pn[(k + 1)∆t]− Pn[k∆t],
∆Qn[k] = Qn[(k + 1)∆t]−Qn[k∆t],
∆P fl [k] = P
f
l [(k + 1)∆t]− P fl [k∆t],
for n = 1, . . . ,M and define
∆Pn = [∆Pn[1] · · · ∆Pn[k] · · · ∆Pn[M ]]T ,
∆Qn = [∆Qn[1] · · · ∆Qn[k] · · · ∆Qn[M ]]T ,
∆P fl =
[
∆P fl [1] · · · ∆P fl [k] · · · ∆P fl [M ]
]T
.
Furthermore, let
Ψl = [Ψ[l, 1], . . . ,Ψ[l, n], . . . ,Ψ[l, N ]],
Ψql = [Ψ
q[l, 1], . . . ,Ψq[l, n], . . . ,Ψq[l, N ]],
Ψsl = [(Ψl)
T (Ψql )
T ]T .
Then, clearly,
∆P fl = [∆P1 · · · ∆Pn · · · ∆PN · · · ∆Q1 · · · ∆Qn · · · ∆QN ] (Ψsl )T .
(5.14)
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Now, let ∆P = [∆P1 · · · ∆Pn · · · ∆PN ], ∆Q = [∆Q1 · · · ∆Qn · · · ∆QN ],
and ∆S = [∆P T ∆QT ]T . Then, the system in (5.14) becomes
∆P fl = ∆S(Ψ
s
l )
T . (5.15)
If M ≥ 2N , then (5.15) is an overdetermined system. Moreover, assuming
the ISFs are approximately constant over the M + 1 measurements,2 we can
obtain an estimate of Ψsl from least-squares error estimation as
(Ψˆsl )
T = (∆ST∆S)−1∆ST∆Sfl , (5.16)
the first N elements of which are the desired measurement-based active power
ISFs, Ψl, for line `l.
Practical Considerations for the ISF Estimation. In the same manner
as noted for LFs in Section 3.3.2, the estimation of the measurement-based
ISF via (5.16) suffers a number of shortcomings: (i) it requires a complete
set of data, i.e., M sets of injection and line flow measurements, where M >
2N ; and (ii) it gives equal weight to all measurements, regardless of when
they were taken. One approach to addressing these shortcomings is the
deployment of a weighted least squares (WLS) formulation of (5.16) given by
(Ψˆsl )
T = (∆STW∆S)−1∆STW∆P fl , (5.17)
whereW is the weighting matrix, which can be selected to give more weight to
recent measurements (see, e.g., [18]). Additional improvements in the speed
of computation and the number of required measurement sets can be made,
respectively, through the application of recursive least-squares (see, e.g., [18])
and methods from compressed sensing (see, e.g., [43]). In this chapter, we
adopt the WLS approach in (5.17) with a diagonal weighting matrix W ,
where W [k, k] = fM−k and f ∈ (0, 1], for the purpose of demonstrating
the benefits of our measurement-based SCED formulation. Additionally, we
analyze the appropriate selection of the parameters M and f in Section 5.4.1.
2We provide an empirical analysis of this assumption in Appendix B.
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5.3.2 Measurement-Based SCED Constraints
Our primary goal in this chapter is to leverage the measurement-based LF
estimation approach described in Chapter 3 and the measurement-based ISF
estimation approach described above to remove the dependence on a sys-
tem model of the SCED in (5.9). To this end, we reformulate the SCED
power balance, network, and security constraints, (5.9b), (5.9e), and (5.9f),
respectively.
Power Balance Constraint. As described in Chapter 3, we may deploy
the measurement-based LFs from (3.20) to reformulate the losses in (5.9b)
as
∆Pˆ ` = ΛˆT∆P g. (5.18)
Doing so ensures that the losses resulting from incremental increases in the
generation at each bus to meet the load are accurately computed, which will
in turn ensure the accurate dispatch of units to meet the load, including
losses.
Network Constraints. Let Ψˆ be the L × N matrix of the measurement-
based active power ISF estimates, each row of which is obtained by taking
the first N entries of the vector estimated with (5.17). As described in
Section 5.2, model-based ISFs form the basis of the network description in
the real-time SCED. To remove the model dependence of (5.9), we deploy Ψˆ
to re-formulate the network constraints (5.9e) as
∆
¯
P f ≤ Ψˆ∆P ≤ ∆P¯ f . (5.19)
With these reformulated network constraints, the real-time SCED constraints
will be based on pre-contingency line flows that accurately reflect real-time
conditions. The measurement-based ISFs are also instrumental to measurement-
based contingency analysis and the formulation of security constraints.
Sensitivity-Based Contingency Screening. The measurement-based ISFs
can also be used to compute the LODFs and PTDFs, which may subsequently
be used to perform contingency selection and formulate security constraints.
Contingency selection is the process of choosing the contingencies for which
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it is critical to perform contingency analysis from the set of all possible con-
tingencies (i.e., to construct what is often referred to as the priority list)
[13]. This process is typically a coarse assessment of the severity of contin-
gencies in order to select only those with a high impact for more detailed
study in RTCA and thus reduce the computational burden associated with
assessing all possible contingencies. As mentioned in Section 5.2.2, in prac-
tice, contingency selection occurs by a combination of operator discretion and
systematic approaches. One such approach involves using ISFs to assess the
approximate impact of every possible contingency on every other element—
similar to performing dc contingency analysis—in order to ascertain the most
severe among them. The application of the measurement-based ISFs in this
context offers several substantial enhancement to the SCED. The adaptive
nature of the measurement-based ISFs reduces or eliminates the impacts of
model accuracies (e.g., erroneous model data or undetected changes in sys-
tem topology) on: (i) the identification of contingencies and their relative
severity during contingency selection; (ii) the identification, through contin-
gency analysis, of those facilities in the system that will be overloaded by a
given outage (by providing an accurate contingency list); and (iii) the formu-
lation of security constraints that accurately reflect the impacts of outages
and injections.
To conduct online measurement-based contingency selection, the system
operator could deploy the measurement-based ISFs and LODFs to compute
the impacts of all potential contingencies (or a pre-determined subset of all
potential contingencies composed of a set larger than the current contingency
list). For each potential outage of a line `l, the operator analyzes the flow
impacts on each non-outage line `u as follows:
|Ψˆu∆P + Ξˆ[u, l]Ψˆl∆P | ≤ ∆P¯ f
u,cfl
, (5.20)
where Ξˆ[u, l] is the measurement-based estimate of the LODF of line `u with
respect to the outage of line `l. Similarly, for each potential outage of a
generator j, the operator analyzes the flow impacts on each line `u as follows:
|Ψˆu∆P + (Ψˆuα(cgj )eTj )∆P | ≤ ∆P¯ fu,cgl . (5.21)
If a generator or line contingency is found to cause an overload via (5.20)
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or (5.21), respectively, a mon-con pair for the contingency and each cor-
responding overloaded element is added to the contingency list, which is
subsequently assessed in ac contingency analysis and, if necessary, populated
into Cf and Cg.
Additionally, if the post-contingency flows computed with (5.20) or (5.21)
conflict substantially with those computed using ac contingency analysis, e.g.,
if a flow difference of more than 40% is identified (greater than the flow error
between the various ac and dc models studied in [54]), the system operator
could flag a potential error in the ac system model, which could be investigate
using methods such as “parity checking”, which is used in fault detection (see,
e.g., [62]). Furthermore, on such occasions, the system operator could use the
results of the online measurement-based contingency selection in (5.20) and
(5.21) in addition to, or in lieu of, such (potentially erroneous) ac contingency
analysis results to formulate the security constraints in the SCED.
Security Constraints. We reformulate the line outage security constraints
for each line outage mon-con pair, (`u, c
f
l ) ∈ Cf , to reflect the utilization of
the measurement-based ISFs as
∆
¯
P f
u,cfl
≤ Ψˆu∆P + Ξˆ[u, l]Ψˆl∆P ≤ ∆P¯ f
u,cfl
. (5.22)
Additionally, we reformulate the security constraints for each generator out-
age mon-con pair (`u, c
g
j ) ∈ Cg as
∆
¯
P f
u,cgj
≤ Ψˆu∆P + (Ψˆuα(cgj )eTj )∆P ≤ ∆P¯ fu,cgj . (5.23)
With the reformulated network and security constraints in (5.19) and in
(5.22) and (5.23), respectively, the real-time SCED no longer relies on a sys-
tem model. Instead, the system operator continuously updates the estimate
of Λˆ via (3.21) and (3.20), Ψˆ via (5.17), and recomputes Ξˆ via (2.39) and
(2.40), as new PMU measurements become available and uses the most up-
to-date estimates to perform contingency selection/analysis, identify and for-
mulate the necessary security constraints, and formulate the real-time SCED.
This measurement-based real-time SCED is adaptive to changing system con-
ditions, such as detected or undetected topology changes, variations in bus
injections, and even changes in line and other system parameters due to
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loading or extreme temperature conditions. As such, the dispatch targets
and LMPs resulting from the measurement-based SCED process will reflect
real-time system conditions.
A key strength of our proposed measurement-based SCED approach is
its consistency with the current real-time SCED framework; the structure
of the SCED formulation is left largely unchanged, but more appropriate
data is used as the basis for that structure and the process by which that
data is obtained is made more flexibility to changing real-time conditions.
The result is an enhanced and adaptive real-time SCED. The following case
studies demonstrate the adaptability of our measurement-based approach to
the real-time SCED.
5.4 Case Studies
In the following case studies, we compare the model-based, measurement-
based, and actual ISFs and sensitivities derived from the ISFs, e.g., PTDFs
and LODFs, and the impacts when utilizing them to determine the generator
dispatch and LMPs via the real-time SCED. To focus on the impacts of
incorrect ISFs on the SCED outcomes in the following case studies, we assume
the LFs are known—the impacts on the SCED outcomes of erroneous LFs
are thoroughly described in Chapter 3.
We deploy (2.38) to compute the conventional, model-based ISFs. Fur-
thermore, we calculate the actual ISFs used in our studies by (i) increasing
the net active power injection at each bus by 0.01 p.u., and (ii) computing
the change in line active power flows via a solution to the full nonlinear ac
power flow with the appropriate system model, and assuming the net load
injection change is balanced according to distributed load slack weights, αd,
defined ∀n ∈ N by
αdn =
∑
v∈Dn P
d
v,0∑
v∈D P
d
v,0
, (5.24)
where P dv,0 is the case nominal load injection for load v; to compute the actual
ISFs, for each net injection increase and ac-power flow solution, we take the
ratio of the ac-power-flow-calculated change in the line active power flows
and the change in the net active power injection.
We compute the measurement-based ISF estimates with (5.17), and carry
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out the estimation procedures with simulated PMU measurements (assumed
to be collected at a measurement frequency of 30/s) of the random fluctua-
tions in each load injection v ∈ D, which are generated according to
P dv [k] = P
d
v,0[k] + σ1P
d
v,0[k]ν1 + σ2ν2, (5.25)
where P dv,0[k] is nominal load injection for load v at instant k, and ν1 and ν2
are pseudorandom values drawn from a normal distribution with zero mean
and standard deviations σ1, σ2 = 0.01, respectively (σ1P
d
v,0[k]ν1 represents
random load fluctuations, whereas σ2ν2 represents measurement noise). We
compute simulated PMU measurements of generator injections, P gi [k], for
each generator i ∈ G, and line active power flows, P fl [k] for each line `l ∈ L,
corresponding to the loads at instant k by solving (2.9) with pre-allocation
generation outputs P g[k − 1], and loads P d[k], nominal bus reactive power
injections Q0 and voltages V0 and distributed generator slack weights, α
g,
defined ∀n ∈ N by
αgn =
∑
i∈Gn P¯
g
i∑
i∈G P¯
g
i
. (5.26)
We compute the fluctuations in net active power injection at each bus, ∆Pn,
at each time instant, k, using (2.1). For simplicity, we again assume no
variation in the load reactive power injections, i.e., ∆Qdv[k] = 0, ∀v ∈ D. We
emphasize, however, that this assumption does not impact the nature of the
results presented.
5.4.1 Case Studies I: The 6-Bus Test System
We demonstrate the proposed measurement-based real-time SCED using a
modified version of the 3-generator, 6-bus test system, the topology of which
is shown in Fig. 3.1, which is provided in the simulation package MAT-
POWER [56]. When solving the SCED, we assume each load has an infinite
willingness to pay, i.e., the demand is inelastic, and each generator, i, submits
a quadratic offer function of the form ai(P
g
i )
2 + biP
g
i + ci, the parameters of
which are provided in Table 3.1.
On the Selection of M and f . The WLS estimation procedure in (5.17)
has two degrees of degrees of freedom: (i) the selection of the number of
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Figure 5.1: Sensitivity of the ISF estimation error to the selection of M
under steady-state operating conditions with f = 1.
sample sets, M , to include in the estimation, i.e. the size of the measure-
ment window; and (ii) the selection of f ∈ (0, 1] so as to specify the diagonal
weighting matrix W . A larger measurement window, M , increases the ac-
curacy of the estimation and decreases its susceptibility to noise when the
system is in steady state at the expense of increased error when the operation
point changes [63]. The selection of f impacts the weight given to the mea-
surements from each measurement instant in the measurement window and
choosing f < 1 can improve the tracking of the estimator under changing
operating conditions at the expense of steady-state accuracy [64]. Further-
more, the selection of M and f must be balanced so as to ensure the regressor
matrix is full column rank. We demonstrate the impacts of the selection of
M and f on the ISF estimation with the following series of examples and
provide some guidelines for their selection.
To illustrate the impacts on the ISF mean-squared error (MSE) of the
selection of M under steady-state conditions, we simulate 500 PMU mea-
surements using the process outlined above at the nominal 6-bus power flow
solution. Then, we compute the ISFs using (5.17) with f = 1 and with M
varied from 20 to 380 measurement instants in increments of 20. The ISF
estimates are compared to the actual ISFs, which are computed by repeat-
edly solving the ac power flow equations around the operating point at each
measurement instant with a 0.01 p.u. increase in the net injection at each
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Figure 5.2: Sensitivity of the ISF estimation error at instant 350 to the
selection of f under changing operating conditions with M = 120.
bus and taking the ratio of line flow changes to the net injection change.
As shown in Fig. 5.1, as we increase the value of M , the MSE between
the estimated and actual ISFs decreases—substantially between M = 20
and M = 100 and then slowly for M > 120. This finding suggests that
one should select as large an M as is computationally feasible. However, as
we show below, when performing the estimation under changing operating
conditions, the ISF MSE may not decrease with increasing M . Furthermore,
the ISF MSE can be improved under changing conditions by selecting f < 1.
To demonstrate the impacts on the ISF MSE of the selection of f and M
under changing operating conditions, we again simulate 500 PMU measure-
ments, however now we increase the load at bus 4 linearly by 100% between
measurement instants 300 and 400, assuming the load increase is balanced by
the generators in the system according to the distributed slack policy defined
in (5.26). We then compute four cases of the ISF estimation using (5.17) with
estimation parameters f and M : (i) executed at measurement instance 350
with M = 120 and f varied from 0.72 to 1 measurement instants in incre-
ments of 0.02; (ii) f = 1 and M varied from 140 to 500 measurement instants
in increments of 20 and executed at each measurement instance; (iii) with
f = 1 and M = 120 executed at measurement instants 140 to 500 in incre-
ments of 20; and (iv) with f = 0.98 and M = 120 executed at measurement
instants 140 to 500 in increments of 20. We select M = 120 in these cases
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Figure 5.3: Impacts on ISF estimation error under changing operating
conditions of the selection of M and f .
based on the the relatively low steady-state ISF MSE found in the above
sensitivity study for this value of M . For each case, we compare the ISF
estimates to the actual ISFs computed at the corresponding measurement
instant.
As is clear from Fig. 5.2, the ISF MSE in case (i) is minimized during
the operating point change for a fixed M by selecting a value of f close to
1 (or, alternatively, by selecting a value of f such that the weights for the
oldest measurements in the measurement window do not decay to near zero
rendering the measurements ineffectual and the regressor matrix nearly sin-
gular). As shown in Fig. 5.3, in case (ii), the MSE increases considerably
during the operating point change between measurement instants 300 and
400, due to the inclusion of pre-operating point change data from measure-
ment instants 140 through 300 in the estimation. However, in case (iii), in
which we select f = 1 and a sliding measurement window of M = 120, the
MSE is decreased compared to case (ii) during the operating point change
as fewer pre-operating point measurements are included in the measurement
window throughout the change. Finally, in case (iv), in which we select
f = 0.98, the ISF MSE when adapting to the operating point change is
improved further still due to the bias introduced toward the most recently
obtained measurements in the measurement window. However, the ability to
track the operating point change in cases (iii) and (iv) comes at the expense
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Table 5.1: LMPs with undetected topology change.
model-based measurement-based
LMP [$/MWh] LMP [$/MWh]
bus
undetected
outage
detected outage pre-outage post-outage
1 19.54 17.41 19.54 17.65
2 19.48 13.99 19.48 13.91
3 20.04 30.92 20.04 31.18
4 20.26 20.91 20.25 20.77
5 20.40 52.73 20.40 53.12
6 19.63 30.04 19.63 29.91
of additional steady-state MSE, as illustrated by the MSE from measure-
ment instants 140 through 300 for those cases. Thus, as expected, there is
a tradeoff between the estimator’s ability to accurately track changing op-
erating conditions and the steady-state accuracy. Our observations from a
number of tests carried out on IEEE test systems of varying sizes suggest
that for larger-scale systems M ≈ 4N and f ≈ e−2.4M are appropriate for bal-
ancing tracking and steady-state error, and to ensure the regressor matrix is
non-singular.
Undetected Line Outage. In this study, we simulate 600 PMU measure-
ments using the approach outlined above and assume there is an undetected
outage of line `3 at measurement instant 300 and that the real-time SCED
is executed at measurement instant 500. We compute the ISFs at each mea-
surement instant beginning with instant 120 using (5.17) and with M = 120
and f = 0.98, and execute the SCED every 20 measurement instants. For
buses 1, 2, and 6 (generator buses) and buses 3 through 5 (load buses), and
at measurement instants 120 (pre-outage) and 500 (post-outage), Table 5.1
shows: (i) the undetected-outage, model-based LMPs, which are the LMPs
that would be realized in the presence of the undetected outage; (ii) the
detected-outage, model-based LMPs, which are the LMPs that would be re-
alized if the outage was detected; and (iii) the measurement-based estimates
of the LMPs. Unsurprisingly, there is a large discrepancy between the un-
detected and detected outage model-based LMPs, more than $30/MWh at
bus 5. The measurement-based LMPs, however, closely track the correct
model-based LMPs regardless of whether or not the outage is detected.
Furthermore, the measurement-based LMPs converge quickly to the cor-
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Figure 5.4: Measurement- and correct-model-based LMP evolution at a
subset of buses with outage of line `3.
rect values following the outage of line `3. Figure 5.4 shows the evolution of
the measurement-based and correct-model-based LMPs at buses 1 and 3 (a
generator and load bus, respectively) before, during, and after the outage.
As shown Fig. 5.4, the measurement-based LMPs at both buses are nearly
coincident with the correct-model-based LMPs prior to the contingency at
measurement instant 300, after which there is a period of 100 measurements
during which the measurement-based LMPs diverge. However, as the mea-
surement window moves past the pre-outage measurement period, starting
at measurement instant 400, the measurement-based LMPs again track the
correct-model-based LMP values.
Incorrect Data Impacts on Security Analysis. In this study, we simu-
late 600 PMU measurements using the approach described above and assume
the line `5 impedance data in the model is incorrectly thought to be 20%
higher than its true value. The ISFs are again estimated at each measure-
ment instant beginning with instant 120 using (5.17) and with M = 120 and
f = 0.98. We run ac contingency analysis with sensitivity-based contingency
selection and the real-time SCED at measurement instant 400. Table 5.2
shows the overloads identified and SCED LMPs with: (i) the model-based
contingency selection and SCED run with incorrect line data; (ii) the model-
based contingency selection and SCED run with correct line data; and (iii)
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Table 5.2: Identified overloads and LMPs with incorrect model data.
model-based
incorrect
data
correct data measurement-based
identified
overload
– (`5, c
f
6 ) (`5, c
f
6 )
bus LMP [$/MWh]
1 19.86 20.99 21.09
2 19.80 19.02 18.96
3 20.36 20.29 20.28
4 20.57 23.62 23.99
5 20.73 21.57 21.66
6 19.95 19.83 19.81
the measurement-based contingency selection and SCED.
The model-based contingency selection run with the model-based ISFs
finds no potential overloads and so no security constraints are added to the
model-based SCED formulation. As a result, the model-based SCED with
incorrect line data LMPs are similar at all buses, except for differences due
to losses. However, with correct line impedance data, contingency selection
identifies a potential overload with respect to (`5, c
f
6), which is confirmed by
contingency analysis. As such, a security constraint is added in the model-
based SCED formulation with correct line data, which binds on execution
producing significantly different LMPs than in the incorrect data case. The
measurement-based contingency selection identifies the overload (`5, c
f
6) and
the resulting SCED with the measurement-based security constraints pro-
duces LMPs that track those in the model-based case with correct line data.
5.4.2 Case Studies II: The 118-Bus Test System
In this section, we present the results of case studies carried out using a
modified version of the IEEE 54-generator, 186-line, 118-bus test system [57].
The test system has been modified by reducing the thermal limits on a subset
of tranimssion lines, reported in Table 4.1, so as to introduce transmission
congestion in the SCED. As before, we assume each load has an infinite
willingness to pay, i.e., the demand is inelastic, and each generator, i, submits
a quadratic offer function of the form ai(P
g
i )
2 + biP
g
i + ci, the parameters of
which we take from the test case [57].
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Figure 5.5: LMP errors at a highly impacted subset of buses due to the
undetected outage of double-circuit `98, `99.
Undetected Line Outage. In this study, we simulate 1500 PMU measure-
ments of load active power consumption and generator active power produc-
tion according to the procedure outlined above. Further, we assume there
is an undetected outage of the double circuit consisting of lines `98 and `99
at measurement instant 500 and that the real-time SCED is executed at
measurement instant 1400. We compute estimates of the ISFs at each mea-
surement instant beginning with instant 240 using (5.17) and with M = 236
and f = 0.99.
Figure 5.5 shows the absolute LMP errors for the model-based SCED with
an undetected outage and the measurement-based SCED compared to the
model-based SCED with the detected outage at a highly impacted subset
of buses. The undetected changes in system topology have a significant
impact on the prices realized with the real-time SCED process, especially
at those buses close to transmission lines at their limit, e.g., buses 49 and
50 or buses 66 and 67. The LMP MSE with the undetected outage in the
dc-model-based SCED with respect to the detected-outage, dc-model-based
LMPs is $14.4/MWh across all buses. In contrast, the measurement-based
LMPs track the detected-outage, model-based LMPs well resulting in an
LMP MSE of $0.90/MWh.
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Table 5.3: Identified line outage overloads common to all cases and those
unidentified due to incorrect data.
overloaded
line #
overload w.r.t. outage of line #
identified overloads common to all cases
8 33,36,37,51,54
31 16,33,34,36,38,51,54,104,116
71 16,33,34,36,37,38,54,70,74,82,93,94,97,107,116,119
98,99 16,33,34,36,37,38,51,54,74,82,93,94,96,97,104,116,119
138,139 16,33,34,36,37,38,51,54,70,74,82,93,94,96,97,104,107,116,119
overloads unidentified due to bad data
31 70,74,82,119
Inaccurate System Model Data. In this study, we simulate the real-time
SCED in the presence of erroneous model data. To this end, we perturb the
line impedance on each of the top 30% of loaded lines by a random multiple in
[0.7, 1.3] drawn from a uniform distribution. We simulate 600 measurements
using the same simulated load PMU data used in the previous case and
compute the line flows with the incorrect and correct data. Further, we
compute estimates of the ISFs at each measurement instant beginning with
instant 240 using (5.17) and with M = 236 and f = 0.99 and assume the
real-time SCED is executed at measurement instant 500.
We perform sensitivity-based contingency selection on the 20 and 10 most
impactful line and generator contingencies, respectively, to identify overloads.
The contingencies that resulted in overloads during contingency analysis
(and, in the measurement-based SCED, those that were identified as causing
overloads by measurement-based contingency selection) and thus necessitate
the formulation of security constraints are reported in Tables 5.3 and 5.4.
As reported in Table 5.3, the incorrect model data results in the failure of
model-based contingency selection/analysis to identify line contingency pairs
(`31, c
f
70), (`31, c
f
74), (`31, c
f
82), and (`31, c
f
119). Furthermore, as shown in Ta-
ble 5.4, the inaccurate model data results in the incorrect identification of
generator contingency pair (`71, c
g
40). The unidentified (mis-identified) over-
loads translate into fewer (additional) constraints in the SCED that subse-
quently impact the market outcomes. The measurement-based contingency
selection, on the other hand, identifies the appropriate contingency overloads
and results in the formulation of the correct security constraints.
Cases of omission and commission in the selection of contingency con-
straints, along with erroneous data model data can significantly impact the
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Table 5.4: Identified generator outage overloads common to all cases and
those mis-identified due to incorrect data.
overloaded
line #
overload w.r.t. outage of generator #
identified overloads common to all cases
8 1,6
31 10,21,22,23,24,25,37,40
71 1,6,10,22,23,24,25,37
98,99 1,6,10,21,22,23,24,25
138,139 1,6,10,21,22,23,24,25,37
overloads mis-identified due to bad data
71 40
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Figure 5.6: Measurement- and model-based dispatch errors resulting from
incorrect model data.
generator dispatch determined by the SCED. Figure 5.6 compares the differ-
ence between the measurement- and model-based dispatches and the actual
dispatch when the SCED is solved with the security constraints for each re-
spective case identified above. Clearly, the existence of erroneous model data
and the follow-on effects such data has on the constraints in the SCED have a
serious impact on the incorrect-model-data-based dispatch that can be miti-
gated by eradicating the model dependence with the proposed measurement-
based approach.
An incorrect dispatch itself is not problematic from the perspective of
maintaining reliability; however, the misrepresentation of the physical sys-
tem due to erroneous model data may result in an insecure dispatch, i.e., a
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Table 5.5: Base and outage case line flows on limited lines due to dispatch
from SCED solved with actual, incorrect-data-model-, and
measurement-based ISFs.
line flow [p.u.]
base case (no outages) `36 outage `96 outage
line
limit
(p.u.)
actual
model-
based
meas.-
based
actual
model-
based
meas.-
based
actual
model-
based
meas.-
based
`8 2.0 1.61 1.74 1.60 2.00 2.16 2.00 1.58 1.71 1.58
`31 0.5 0.194 0.197 0.193 0.330 0.342 0.331 0.008 0.017 0.006
`71 0.6 0.381 0.379 0.380 0.379 0.377 0.379 0.340 0.332 0.340
`98, `99 1.4 1.00 1.06 1.00 1.015 1.07 1.01 1.43 1.55 1.43
`138, `139 1.4 1.40 1.52 1.40 1.40 1.52 1.40 1.40 1.52 1.40
dispatch in which at least one transmission element is overloaded in the base
case (no outages) or in the event of a contingency. To illustrate this effect,
we present in Table 5.5 a comparison of the line flows computed for lines
near their thermal limit for a sample of outages with the actual, incorrect
data model-based, and measurement-based dispatches on the system model
with correct data. The reported flows represent the flows that would arise
in the system for each of the respective cases if the dispatch for that case
were implemented. As can be seen in the table, the incorrect model data
results in an insecure dispatch in the base case as well as in the reported
contingency cases—the overloaded lines are shown in bold in the table. In
the base case, the double circuit consisting of lines `138 and `139 is overloaded
by 8.6%. Moreover, for contingencies shown, lines `8 and the double circuit
consisting of lines `98 and `99 are respectively overload by 8.0% and 10.7%.
However, the measurement-based SCED results in a secure dispatch further
illustrating the benefits of our proposed approach.
Dispatch errors also have economic impact via the LMPs computed at the
SCED solution, which will be used to settle the market. Figure 5.7a shows the
deviations between the dc-model-based LMPs with correct line impedance
data and the incorrect data dc-model-based LMPs and measurement-based
LMPs. Overall, the measurement-based SCED approach results in LMPs
close to those found with the correct line data, the MSE over all buses is
$1.67/MWh compared to $5.25/MWh for the incorrect data dc-model. How-
ever, there are some deviations between the LMPs computed with dc-model-
based with correct data and measurement-based approaches. To give some
insight into the nature of these differences, Fig. 5.7b shows the correct-data,
dc-model-based LMPs and measurement-based LMPs compared to LMPs
computed with the actual ISFs, which recall are computed by repeatedly
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Figure 5.7: Model-based and measurement-based absolute LMP errors due
to the incorrect model data for heavily loaded lines with respect to correct
data, dc-model and actual LMPs at a highly impacted subset of buses.
solving the ac power flow.
When compared to the actual model-based LMPs, the measurement-based
LMPs perform much better than the dc-model-based LMPs, the MSE is
$0.23/MWh compared to the $1.78/MWh for the correct-data, dc-model-
based LMPs. This finding suggests that the measurement-based SCED ap-
proach is able to capture information that the dc-model-based SCED ap-
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proach does not, e.g., the impacts of reactive power and voltage changes
in response to active power injection changes on active power flows, which
is subsequently reflected in the LMPs. As such, the differences between
the measurement-base LMPs and correct-data, dc-model-based LMPs, re-
ported in Fig. 5.7a, may actually be indicative of errors in the correct-
data, dc-model-based LMPs related to the underlying dc assumptions; the
measurement-based approach requires the assumption that the relationship
between active power injections and active power flows is linear, however it
does not require the dc assumptions and thus is not impacted by the error
introduced by those assumptions.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a measurement-based approach to the real-time
SCED. Our approach leverages sensitivities estimated from PMU measure-
ments to perform contingency selection and formulate security constraints,
as well as to reformulate the model-based power balance and network flow
constraints of the model-based real-time SCED. As shown in our case stud-
ies, the measurement-based real-time SCED is robust to undetected system
disturbances and inaccurate model data and results in market outcomes that
more accurately reflect real-time system conditions.
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CHAPTER 6
CONCLUDING REMARKS
In this chapter, we give a brief recap of the thesis, and highlight the key
contributions. Then, we conclude with some insights gained by undertaking
the work presented herein.
6.1 Thesis Summary and Contributions
Maintaining operational reliability has been and will continue to be for the
foreseeable future the primary goal of power system operators. Moreover,
the swelling tide of renewable resource additions to the electricity system,
both at the transmission and distribution level, and the additional opera-
tional challenges posed by the uncertainty they add to the system will push
current operational strategies and tools to the limit of their effectiveness. To
keep up with the growing complexity of the system, operators will require
new analysis tools that harness the vast number of measurements that are
beginning to be collected and the economy of computational resources that
have become available in the past decade.
In this thesis, we proposed a set of operational reliability tools that can be
integrated into the existing real-time market framework used by ISOs/RTOs,
mainly the SCED, with two main goals in mind: (i) to remove the model
dependence of the primary tools used by system operators in real-time op-
erations; and (ii) to address the challenge of assessing and mitigating large
outage angles, such as that which contributed to the 2011 San Diego black-
out. To these ends, we developed the measurement-based LFs (Chapter
3), derived a sensitivity-based LOAF using our generalization of the FCT
(Chapter 4), and demonstrated the use of measurement-based ISFs and LFs
for contingency selection, and in the formulation of the measurement-based
SCED (Chapter 5).
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Our tools and the case studies carried out with them demonstrate the
potential gains that can be made, both reliability and economic, by adopt-
ing tools that harness sensitivities estimated from real-time measurements,
rather than those computed from an oﬄine model. Furthermore, our LOAF-
based tools further emphasize the prominent role that power flow sensitivities
play in achieving operational reliability and, more specifically, the improved
detection and mitigation of large outage angle that can be achieved by their
application.
6.2 Conclusions
Advances in measurement availability and quality via the expanded instal-
lation of PMUs is certain to continue opening doors to more effective and
adaptive power system operational tools. Our hope is that the tools pre-
sented in this thesis will be used to enhance existing operational reliability
processes, as well as become a jumping off point for this new generation of
tools, which will begin to illustrate to system operators the high value of
PMU measurement data, and of measurement-based analysis tools for effec-
tive, efficient, and reliable power system operations.
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APPENDIX A
SUPPLEMENTAL POWER FLOW
SENSITIVITY DERIVATION
In Chapter 2, we derived the fundamental power flow sensitivities under
the assumption that the voltages are constant at voltage-controlled buses,
i.e., ∆V c = 0, and that the active power mismatch, ∆pm, is zero after the
distributed slack policy has been imposed. In this appendix, we furnish
proof that the derivation provided indeed results in ∆Vc = 0 and ∆pm = 0,
as claimed.
Recall from Chapter 2 that we partition the inverse of the Jacobian as
follows:
J−1 =
 −F −M−E −H
−rT −wT
 , (A.1)
and further partitioned those partitions as follows:
E =
[
Ecc Ecu
Euc Euu
]
, H =
[
Hcc Hcu
Huc Huu
]
,
and M =
[
Mcc Mcu
Muc Muu
]
.
Additionally, recall that
U = −H−1cc (Ec + EcαrT ), (A.2)
and
W = −H−1cc (Hc + EcαwT ). (A.3)
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A.1 Proof That ∆Vc = 0
Recall that
∆V ≈ Π∆P ′ + Πq∆Q′, (A.4)
where
Π = E + EαrT +Hc∗U, (A.5)
Πq = H + EαwT +Hc∗W, (A.6)
By substituting (A.2), (A.3), (A.5), and (A.6) into (A.4) we obtain
∆V ≈(E + EαrT +Hc∗(−H−1cc (Ec + EcαrT )))∆P ′
+(H + EαwT +Hc∗(−H−1cc (Hc + EcαwT )))∆Q′, (A.7)
where Ec = [Ecc Ecu] and Hc = [Hcc Hcu].
From (A.7), we conclude that
∆Vc ≈(Ec + EcαrTc +Hcc(−H−1cc (Ec + EcαrT )))∆P ′
+(Hc + Ecαw
T
c +Hcc(−H−1cc (Hc + EcαwT )))∆Q′, (A.8)
where w = [wTc w
T
u ]
T and r = [rTc r
T
u ]
T . Noting that Hcc(−H−1cc ) = −Icc,
where Icc ∈ RNc×Nc is an identity matrix, (A.8) can be simplified to obtain
∆Vc ≈(Ec + EcαrTc − Ec − EcαrT )))∆P ′
+(Hc + Ecαw
T
c −Hc − EcαwT )))∆Q′,
the right-hand side of which is identically zero, as claimed.
A.2 Proof That ∆pm = 0
Now, recall that
∆pm ≈ γT∆P ′ + (γq)T∆Q′, (A.9)
where
γT = rT + rTαrT + wTc U, (A.10)
(γq)T = wT + rTαwT + wTcW, (A.11)
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By substituting (A.2), (A.3), (A.10), and (A.11) into (A.9) we obtain
∆pm ≈(rT + rTαrT + wTc (−H−1cc (Ec + EcαrT )))∆P ′
+(wT + rTαwT + wTc (−H−1cc (Hc + EcαwT )))∆Q′, (A.12)
which we simplify as follows:
∆pm ≈((rT − wTc H−1cc Ec) + (rT − wTc H−1cc Ec)αrT )∆P ′
+((wT − wTc H−1cc Hc) + (rTαwT − wTc H−1cc EcαwT ))∆Q′. (A.13)
By the definition of the inverse Jacobian and our defined partitions in
(A.1), we have that r = ∂pm
∂P˜
, w = ∂pm
∂Q˜
, wc =
∂pm
∂Q˜c
, H−1cc =
∂Q˜c
∂Vc
, Ec =
∂Vc
∂P˜
, and
Hc =
∂Vc
∂Q˜
, from which we have that
wTc H
−1
cc Ec =
[
∂pm
∂Q˜c
]T [
∂Q˜c
∂Vc
][
∂Vc
∂P˜
]
=
[
∂pm
∂P˜
]T
=rT , (A.14)
and
wTc H
−1
cc Hc =
[
∂pm
∂Q˜c
]T [
∂Q˜c
∂Vc
][
∂Vc
∂Q˜
]
=
[
∂pm
∂Q˜
]T
=wT . (A.15)
Now, by substituting (A.14) and (A.15) into (A.16), we obtain
∆pm ≈((rT − rT ) + (rT − rT )αrT )∆P ′
+((wT − wT ) + (rTαwT − rTαwT ))∆Q′, (A.16)
the right-had side of which is identically zero, as claimed.
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APPENDIX B
CASE STUDY: POWER FLOW
SENSITIVITY VARIATION WITH
OPERATING POINT
The measurement-based sensitivity estimation approach harnessed through-
out this thesis rests on two fundamental assumptions:
A1. The regressor matrix is nonsingular.
A2. The sensitivity we estimate remains constant over all measurements in
the measurement window.
In this appendix, we present some illustrative examples that provide em-
pirical evidence in support of assumption A2—ensuring the validity of as-
sumption A1 depends on the selection of the estimation parameters M and
f discussed in Section 5.4.1. Our aim is to show that many of the power
flow sensitivities remain relatively constant over a wide range of operating
conditions, i.e., the range of operating conditions that would arise during the
measurement window in a practical measurement-based sensitivity estima-
tion. Primarily, we focus on the ISFs, which are used to formulate network
and security constraints in the SCED, as well as AFs used with the ISFs
to formulate the LOAFs. In addition, we show that the LFs vary approxi-
mately linearly with the operating point, which conforms to our assumption
in Chapter 4 that the line losses on a line are approximately quadratic with
respect to the active power flow on the line.
We conduct the simulations presented in these examples on the 6-bus test
system shown in Fig. 3.1 around the nominal power flow solution provided
with the case (see Section 3.5 for details). To demonstrate the variation of
the sensitivities with changes in the operating point, we vary the active and
reactive power withdrawn at bus 4, a non-voltage controlled bus, around the
nominal operating point by ±0.5 p.u. in increments of 0.1 p.u; the active
and reactive power variations are conducted independently. We solve the
ac power flow using the single slack bus, bus 1, at each active or reactive
power increment. The sensitivities are estimate by taking the difference of
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the relevant quantity at increment i + 1 and that at increment i divided
by the change in active or reactive power, i.e. 0.1 p.u. For example, the
ISF for a line `l at the operating point for increment i was estimated as
Ψi[l, 4] ≈ (P fl (i+ 1)− P fl (i))/0.1.
B.1 Active Power Injection Variation Impacts on
Power Flow Sensitivities
In this section, we illustrate the sensitivity of the ISFs, AFs, and LFs to
changes in the active power consumed at bus 4. In Fig. B.1, we show the
empirical ISFs computed at each active power increment. As shown in the
figure, the ISFs are approximately constant over the range of active power
consumption.
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Figure B.1: Variation in the ISFs with respect to the bus 4 active power
injection, P4.
The changes that do appear in the ISFs, e.g. on lines `1, `2, and `4, are
due to increases in the system-wide active power losses as we increase P4,
which as we show in Fig. B.2, are quadratic in the active power injection at
bus 4.
The relationship of the line losses on a line `l due to the flow on the line
is of interest in the derivation of the LOAFs. In Fig. B.3, we show the line
losses on line `1 plotted against the line flows on line `1 at each increment in
the active power consumption at bus 4. Moreover, we show in the figure a
second-order polynomial fit between the line losses and line flow for line `1.
The accuracy of the fit lends credence to the validity of the assumption of a
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Figure B.2: Variation in the bus 4 LF with respect to the bus 4 active
power injection, P4.
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Figure B.3: Line `1 losses as a function of line `1 active power flow due to
deviation in bus 4 active power injection, P4 away from nominal operating
point.
quadratic relationship between P `l and P
f
l used in the LOAF derivation in
Chapter 4. The relationship shown in Fig. B.3 makes intuitive sense as the
losses on line `1 are quadratically related to the current flowing through the
line.
Finally, in Fig. B.4 we show the variation in the active power AFs with
respect to the bus 4 active power variation. As in the case of the ISFs, the
AFs are relatively constant across the range of active power consumption.
The relative invariance of the AFs and ISFs to changes in active power con-
sumptions is a major contributing factor to the high accuracy of the LOAFs
when used to predict outage angles.
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Figure B.4: Variation in the AFs with respect to the bus 4 active power
injection, P4.
B.2 Reactive Power Injection Variation Impacts on
Power Flow Sensitivities
In this section, we illustrate the sensitivity of the ISFs, AFs, and LFs to
changes in the reactive power consumed at bus 4. In Fig. B.5, we show the
empirical ISFs computed at each reactive power increment. As shown in the
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Figure B.5: Variation in the reactive ISFs with respect to the bus 4 reactive
power injection, Q4.
figure, the ISFs are vary considerably on lines `1, `2, `3, and `5, which are the
lines that connect bus 4 to the voltage controlled buses which supply reactive
power to the system. This variation, which is largely linear, is due to the
variation in the active power losses, shown in Fig. B.6, that occur due to
variations in the reactive power consumed at bus 4. Unlike in the case of the
active power variation shown in Fig. B.1, for which the losses account only for
a small proportion of the active power transfers on the lines due to changes
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Figure B.6: Variation in the bus 4 reactive LF with respect to the bus 4
reactive power injection, Q4.
in active power consumption, in the case of the reactive power variation, the
active power flow changes on the lines are due entirely to changes in the
losses. Thus, the reactive power ISFs exhibit the same characteristics as the
reactive power LFs in response to reactive power injection changes.
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Figure B.7: Variation in the reactive AFs with respect to the bus 4 reactive
power injection, Q4.
Figure B.7 shows the variation in the reactive power AFs with respect
to changes in the bus 4 reactive power injection. As in the case of the
reactive ISFs, the reactive AFs exhibit linear change with the reactive power
consumption variation due to the dependence of those changes on the active
power losses. We also note that the reactive power ISFs and AFs are roughly
an order of magnitude less than their active power counterparts.
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